

The Rice Papers

A large, traditional Japanese wooden torii gate stands prominently in the foreground, its structure partially submerged in clear blue water. The gate is made of weathered, reddish-brown wood. A small black banner with gold Japanese characters hangs from the top bar. In the background, another smaller torii gate is visible, and beyond that, a town with buildings is nestled on a hillside under a clear blue sky. The overall scene is peaceful and scenic.

Volume 5 • 2018

The Rice Papers

A Student Journal of Asian Studies

Volume 5 • 2018

Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah

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Special Thanks

This volume of *The Rice Papers* represents many hours of effort from a group of dedicated people. After a two-year hiatus, we are happy to present you with the fruit of our labor, and we humbly acknowledge the work of those who kept the flame of this project alive over the last few years. Without Chris Honda and Johnny Dinkel, we would not have gotten off the ground this time around.

Thanks also to the professors who helped disseminate our call for submissions and to the many students who responded to that call. With your support, we hope *The Rice Papers* will continue to be a platform for BYU to showcase outstanding undergraduate research papers.

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China and the North Korean Refugee Crisis

by Christina Ahn

On 8 May 2002, shocking images of five North Korean refugees at a Japanese consulate in northeast China were captured. Although two members of the party—both men—successfully made it inside the consulate, two women and a child were dragged away from the gate of their safe haven by Chinese police (Gittings 2002). All five individuals were eventually detained—and though their fates remain unknown, it is likely they were immediately deported to North Korea, possibly the worst outcome for any North Korean defector.

The plight of the refugees in the 2002 consulate incident is not unique; it is estimated that between 30,000 to 60,000 North Korean refugees currently reside in China, with some estimates as high as 200,000 (AsiaToday 2016). China's official policy on North Korean refugees is forcible repatriation, upon which torture, violent interrogations, and sentences to prison camps await. Many refugees meet their demise in such camps, where sexual violence, forced labor, and inhuman treatment is rampant (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). Why does the Chinese government, despite international attention and criticism, maintain its policy of deporting North Korean refugees?

At a glance, it may appear that China adapts its policy in order to maintain amiable relations with its unpredictable neighbor. However, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that China's deportation of refugees is not only a way it shows support to the North Korean regime but also a product of China's historical ties to the North, its concerns regarding the regime's

survival, and its fear of an internal refugee crisis in case the regime collapses. This paper will analyze the historical background of North Korea's refugee situation, China's current refugee policy, and possible explanations for why it adopts such a policy.

Historical Background

Although it is impossible to say that China's relations with North Korea have always been agreeable (particularly in light of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons), the two countries have shared close ties since the emergence of North Korea as a state. The relationship between China and North Korea has been described as "lips and teeth," imagery of the bond that exists between the two countries (Taylor 2013). During the period of Japan's annexation of the Korean Peninsula, for instance, Korean and Chinese communists came together to fight the Japanese. During the Korean War, China sent troops to fight alongside North Korean soldiers (Yoon and Lee 2013). In the years following the Korean War, China backed (and continues to support) North Korea's three dictators: Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un. Currently, not only do China and North Korea share geographical proximity, but they also continue to cooperate economically.

The issue of North Korean refugees has been particularly important in China–North Korea relations since the great North Korean famine of the mid-1990s. The famine—a product of the North Korean government's failed attempt to increase crop production—led to stripping the country's landscape and resources, which in turn resulted in massive losses of grains and cropland (Haggard 2009). Such drops in production led to a sharp decline in North Korea's food supply, from 5.4 million metric tons of grain produced in 1989 to 3.4 million tons in 1995 (Gause 2011). As starvation swept through the country, killing an estimated 300,000 to 3 million people between 1994 and 1998, the number of North Korean defectors also began to climb (Seliger 2006).

The precise number of North Korean refugees in China is unknown because refugees reside there in secret, waiting for a chance to either escape into a different country or choosing to spend the remainder of their lives in hiding. However, the shifting numbers and trends of refugees can be tracked by observing those entering China's neighboring countries, most notably South Korea. According to the Korean Ministry of Unification, the number of North Korean defectors entering South Korea was 947 in 1998. This number rose to 2,706 in 2011, and despite a sharp decline in the past few years, still reached 1,418 in 2016 (Ministry of Unification, n.d.).

Figure 1. Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea

(persons)

Category	'98	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17.9 (provisional)	Total
Male	831	565	510	474	626	424	515	573	608	662	591	795	404	369	305	251	302	153	8,958
Female	116	478	632	811	1,272	960	1,513	1,981	2,195	2,252	1,811	1,911	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	728	22,135
Total	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	881	31,093
Percent age of female defectors	12%	46%	55%	63%	67%	69%	75%	78%	78%	77%	75%	71%	73%	76%	78%	80%	79%	85%	71%

For China, these numbers hold significant meaning; with the border between North and South Korea tightly guarded, the most-frequent escape route for refugees is over the Chinese–North Korean border. A rise in the numbers of refugees indicate more refugees entering China through illegal means, which is both a security concern for China and a movement that it feels the need to stop.


China's Policy

Crossing into China is not the final challenge barring a North Korean defector's path to freedom. Perhaps one of the greatest threats that looms over any defector is the ever-present possibility of capture. China's official policy regarding North Korean refugees is simple: deportation. Officially, China does not recognize North Korean defectors as "refugees" but rather as "illegal (economic) migrants"; and despite North Korean refugees' testimonies of the brutal, government-run prison camps, China is bent on its policy (Choe 2017).

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's words capture the attitude China has toward North Korean refugees: "North Koreans who enter China's territory illegally cannot be called refugees. They came to China via illegal means [and] violated Chinese laws and border regulations" (Phillips and Haas 2017, para. 11). In light of the recent detainment of ten North Koreans, another spokesman indicated that China treated such individuals according to "domestic and international law and humanitarian principles" (Choe 2017, para. 8).

However, China's treatment of North Korean refugees is a far cry from an adherence to international law and "humanitarian principles." Under international law, China cannot legally return individuals to a country that threatens their lives or commits other violations of human rights. These terms, outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, China agreed to in 1982 (Human Rights Watch, n.d.)

Figure 2. Occurrence of Human Rights Violations in North Korea by Category



According to findings by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, which collected data from 46,713 cases, the most-frequent human rights violations in North Korea are of the rights to personal integrity and liberty. These statistics, in addition to those of the other rights listed on the graph, suggest that North Korean refugees fall under the category of those who have had their lives and rights threatened by their government. Instead of protecting such individuals, China has found a way around the issue by deeming North Koreans escaping into China not as “refugees” but as “illegal aliens” (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). Furthermore, despite the Chinese government’s denial of a systematic crackdown on defectors, there have been reports of Chinese citizens being fined for hosting North Korean refugees—or even being paid to turn them in (Phillips and Haas 2017).

The Chinese government has also made efforts to enforce border patrol and block illegal access to China. Most notably, China has built a fence to close off the area of the Tumen River—a common escape route for North Koreans (Noh 2013). Furthermore, China has also reinforced its control of its borders with Mongolia and Laos in order to prevent North Korean refugees from escaping to other countries (Lee 2016). The decreasing number of refugees successfully arriving in South Korea may reflect China’s increasing and intensifying crackdown. By making it difficult for defectors to leave China, the remaining option for refugees is to take up residence and avoid capture, thus reducing the total number of refugees entering countries such as South Korea.

Although valid national interests exist—such as security and the prevention of drug and human trafficking, China’s actions in blocking North Korean refugees from both entering and leaving the country can be argued

as being more than security-motivated. China's criticism of a UN report on North Korean human rights abuses may also be interpreted as being less motivated by security concerns and more by the country's support for the North Korean regime (Albert 2018).

Theories of Why China Has Adopted its Deportation Policy

In observing China's ties to North Korea—past and present—it becomes evident that China's refugee policy is not a simple matter of deporting North Korean defectors. The refugee policy, in fact, is just one way the Chinese government shows its support of the North Korean regime. At a glance, it may seem absurd that China, a powerful player in global politics, continues to maintain its ties to North Korea, a country with little economic growth and a poor international reputation. However, careful observance of the ties between the two countries brings light to *why* China continues to support North Korea and how such support ties into the issue of refugees.

First, China and North Korea have traditionally shared an ideological bond. Not only did China support North Korea during the Korean War, which was a clash between communist North and democratic South, North Korea remains one of China's key socialist neighbors. This has become a particularly important factor following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. Although China has evolved dramatically in recent years, becoming more open to the rest of the world, it has yet to embrace a fully capitalist, democratic system. Here it could be argued that a socialist neighbor provides moral support for China in a world of increasingly democratic governments and institutions.

In such a context, the act of accepting North Korean refugees could suggest to North Korea and the world that China disagrees with North Korean policies. Because these policies are at the root of North Korea's disastrous economy, its inability to provide for its people, widespread starvation, and discontent population, the implication that China disagrees with North Korea's policies could be interpreted as a Chinese criticism of the regime itself. In addition, because refugees are the clearest evidence of North Korea's increasingly disenchanting populace, China's support of the refugees could not only provoke North Korea but also destabilize China–North Korea relations.


Second, North Korea acts as a buffer zone for China, adding a layer of protection from foreign influence, particularly the United States. Currently, the U.S. has around 29,000 troops stationed in South Korea. North Korea, which lies directly between China and South Korea, adds a layer of geographical distance between U.S. troops and China (Albert 2018).

Despite the United States' assurances to China that its alliances in Asia are not a means of suppressing the rise of China, Chinese analysts are skep-

tical (Taylor 2013). During the Korean War, for instance, South Korean and U.S. troops arrived at the Yalu River, inciting action from the Chinese side. If a reunification of the two Koreas was to occur, and U.S. troops maintained their presence in Korea, China would once again be faced with the U.S. military near its border (Pacheo Pardo, and Reeves 2014). In light of the perceived threats of a U.S.–Asian alliance to offset China’s military strength, the North Korean “buffer zone” remains an important and relevant issue for China.

A third possible explanation for China’s deportation of North Korean refugees is the growing economic ties between China and North Korea. Contrary to what many are prone to think, North Korea is not entirely useless as an economic partner, particularly with increasing trade and investment between the country and China. Between the years 2000 and 2010, trade between the two nations increased from \$0.49 billion to \$3.46 billion—more than a 600 percent increase in the course of a decade (Yoon and Lee 2013). In the first half of 2017 alone, trade between North Korea and China amounted to \$2.6 billion (Albert 2018).

Figure 3. China–North Korea Trade Volumes



Bilateral trade between China and North Korea has steadily increased. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)

By 2010, 83 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade was with China, which sheds light on North Korea’s reality as a nation that remains heavily dependent upon China for goods ranging from household products to military equipment (Yoon and Lee 2013). In essence, what was once small-scale trade has expanded to an enterprise in which both countries’ governments are heavily involved, and it is thus in China’s interest to maintain strong relations with North Korea (Taylor 2013).

China's investment in North Korea has seen a dramatic increase from \$1.5 million in 2002 to \$41.2 million in 2008: over 90 percent of the foreign investment in North Korea (Yoon and Lee 2013). Such investments by China are found not only in North Korea's infrastructure but also in the service industry and area of resource development (Ibid.). This third area of development largely answers the question of what China may gain through economic interactions with North Korea.

China currently provides its starving neighbor with the bulk of its energy and food assistance, yet the reciprocity in the relationship is often unclear (Albert 2018). The answer lies in the field of resource development, for North Korea is richer in natural resources than both South Korea and Japan. In addition, North Korea provides China with labor, sending tens of thousands of its people to work in jobs requiring little skill (Pacheod Pardo, and Reeves 2014). For China, which has experienced massive economic growth in a relatively short period, such resources are much needed. North Korea is the perfect candidate for meeting this need not only because of its store of resources but also due to its geographic proximity. Of China's investments in North Korea, the resource development makes up 70 percent of the total. For instance, out of twenty-five resource-developing plans in North Korea involving foreign investment or assistance, China is part of twenty (Yoon and Lee 2013).

These economic ties may explain why the Chinese government would desire to strictly avoid contention caused by the North Korean refugee issue. Even for China, a global power, angering the North Korean regime will result in a backlash, which is a particularly undesirable outcome considering the heavy investments China has made in North Korea. Furthermore, maintaining ties and continuing investments in North Korea would also give China access to the Sea of Japan/East Sea, a geographic advantage, particularly in terms of trade.

The fourth and final explanation deals with a more practical issue for China: a hypothetical surge of North Korean refugees and the resulting turmoil. The Chinese government has expressed that a large wave of North Korean refugees entering China would be "chaos" (Lee 2016). Should China adapt a lenient policy toward North Korean refugees, it is reasonable to project a sharp increase in refugee numbers. Such an increase in turn could result in three specific consequences; First, the destabilization of the North Korean regime; second, internal unrest in China; and third, the influx of refugees and illegal immigrants from other foreign nations.

Despite China's uneasy relationship with North Korea, the statement below illustrates that an even greater matter of concern for China is the collapse of the North Korean regime:

Beijing neither wants to see the sudden collapse of current North Korean leadership, which possibly lead to a civil war or social turmoil and refugees fleeing to China, nor accept a military strike or regime change carried by the U.S. to solve the nuclear issue, which would likely spur North Korea to take risky retaliation action against the U.S., Japan or South Korea, or produce a new regime that is not friendly to China (Ming 2007, p. 6).

Due to illicit activities, including North Korean smugglers bringing in contraband, such as foreign films and South Korean dramas, accessing South Korean radio channels, and contacting people beyond the country in addition to the efforts of defectors, North Korean citizens have become increasingly aware of their situation, despite the efforts of their government to limit information. This trend is a great threat to the North Korean regime, which largely maintains its position of power through a reign of terror and ignorance. A lenient refugee policy would likely lead to a mass North Korean exodus into China, which would further jeopardize the legitimacy and stability of the North Korean regime.

China has both political and economic interests to pursue in North Korea and desires the preservation of the status quo in Korea (Wang 2012). The world has become aware of the conditions in North Korea, largely due to the reports and testimonies of refugees. To accept those seeking asylum would indicate China's disapproval of the North Korean regime, increasing tension not only between the two countries but within North Korea as well (Pacheo Pardo, and Reeves 2014). China's policy remains a seemingly insurmountable obstacle for many who hope to escape North Korea; the consequences of removing that obstacle, then, are easily imaginable.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Beijing has also advised foreign nations to be more lenient on North Korea, because the regime's collapse could result in war (Albert 2018). China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed, "Once a war really happens, the result will be nothing but multiple loss. No one can become a winner" (Bodeen 2017). Indeed, due to its geographic proximity to Korea, China could not avoid the backlash of civil war or unrest in North Korea. Not only would it heavily impact China's current investments, the violence could spread along the China-North Korea border area, accompanied by a sharp rise in displaced persons entering China.

Setting aside the issue of China's current policy, unrest *within* North Korea would inevitably lead to conflict refugees. If North Koreans were displaced due to civil unrest, China could no longer maintain its claim of calling them "economic migrants" and would be forced to extend some form of assistance. Furthermore, should war cause the weakening of the

North Korean regime, there would be no country to return North Korean “migrants” to, deepening China’s refugee crisis.

Also, an increasing number of refugees may lead to difficulties for China in tending to the needs of its own people (Albert 2018). Should North Korean defectors be granted refugee status in China, the Chinese government would unavoidably have to turn its attention to the issue, particularly with the intense international focus on the current refugee issue. With economic development on the forefront of the Chinese government’s list of priorities and ethnic minorities of its own to take care of, an added burden of refugees may be too cumbersome for China. Furthermore, devising plans to help and relocate refugees would reduce China’s capacity to take care of its own citizens, many of whom currently live in poverty. Such government action could spark anti-government and anti-immigrant feelings among Chinese citizens. For these reasons and from a practical perspective, it seems easier for China to simply deny North Koreans refugee status and avoid the possible social problems altogether.

Third, China’s acceptance of North Korean refugees may spark an influx of refugees and illegal immigrants from other foreign countries. Geographically, fourteen countries border China—Mongolia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar being just a few. In recent years, China has been faced with an increasing number of illegal immigrants from its neighboring countries as well as from other nations in Southeast Asia. Illegal immigrants primarily enter China for economic reasons and are often hired due to cheap labor costs. These workers then find work in construction sites, sugarcane fields, and clothing workshops for more than could be made in their respective countries but far less than a Chinese worker is paid (Epstein 2010).

China’s acceptance of North Korean refugees could set a precedent, giving the country’s other neighbors the impression that it is welcoming to refugees and migrants. Such perceptions could lead to uncertainties surrounding China’s immigration and refugee policies, increases in the number of refugees seeking asylum, and further difficulties managing illegal migrants. For years, China has rejected North Korean refugees, justifying its actions by deeming them “economic migrants”; for China to change its stance now may lead to confusion regarding its position on “economic migrants” from other countries. In addition, refugees and migrants from countries other than North Korea could pose a threat to China’s job market and national security, further complicating matters for the Chinese government.

Overall, it may be the rise in the number of refugees that caused China to adopt harsher policies in the last decade. Prior to North Korea’s economic and social crises in the 1990s, the Chinese government was more lenient

toward North Korean defectors, exercising less control regarding the issue unless the North Korean government became directly involved. In the late 1990s, however, China experienced an increase in the number of defectors due to the North Korean famine and has increased inspections and deportations (“Findings” 2013).

Conclusion

In conclusion, China’s deportation of North Korean refugees can be seen as more than a mere policy choice. Vital to the refugee issue is a question of *why* China adopts such a policy and *how* it affects Chinese relations with North Korea. Upon examining these questions in greater depth, the implications of China’s policy are clear. Not only does China desire to maintain its present relations with North Korea due to social, military, and economic interests, it is also concerned with the impact a North Korean refugee acceptance policy may have on internal politics.

Although the number of North Korean refugees consists of only a small portion of China’s total population, the implications of their presence in China, the impact they have on Chinese politics, and the social context from which they seek asylum cannot be ignored. Although China certainly has its own interests and the needs of its people to consider, maintaining its current stance on North Korean refugees simply indicates they are turning a blind eye to a major and glaring problem. This approach can only be temporary, particularly in light of North Korea’s decaying system and crumbling legitimacy. Soon, China will have to face its policy once more and make a decision—whether it be to embrace or to reject those in need of its help.

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The Joss House as an Insight into 19th Century Chinese Immigration

by Joshua Bernhard

“From the theater we went to the principal church or joss-house,” an anonymous author wrote about the San Francisco Chinatown for the *Christian Recorder* in September 1875. “Up three flights of stairs, rickety, worn, and uneven, and through the dark passages full of sickening odors, I reached a dismal, dreary, mysterious, and silent worship-house of this mysterious and superstitious people. Here and there in the temple a dim taper burned, but there were no lights in the halls, stairs, and passages, and the flickering flames only added to the oppressive and, if I may so call it ghostly feeling that overtook me” (Anonymous 1875).

Looking in as an outsider and reporting to a Christian audience, no doubt this writer found the differences between Chinese religious practices and their own to be startling. They wrote only of their own interpretation of their observations of the joss house, making no effort to ask a Chinese person about the meaning of what they saw. In nineteenth century America, this attitude was common toward the racial “other,” and the Chinese in particular were broadly painted as a monolithic people: expansive, mysterious, and beyond understanding. Americans asked and tried to answer the same questions throughout the height of Chinese immigration to the United States: Who were these people? Why were they here? Why did only the men come, why did they never stay, and why would they not assimilate into our culture? Samuel Bowles traveled the country with then-Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax. Bowles summed up the attitude of most Americans

toward the Chinese newcomers by writing in 1869: “They do not come to stay or become citizens, but simply to make their fortunes and go back home and enjoy them . . . they dread nothing more than to die and be buried here, and nearly every China-bound steamer or ship carries back home the bodies of Chinamen, overtaken, as death overtakes us all, in the struggles of their labor and ambition” (p. 397).

Americans were equally concerned about the political stance of the Chinese; they were not interested in becoming citizens, so how would the Chinese immigrants react if China and the U.S. were to enter hostilities? Bowles again observed: “They look down even with contempt upon our newer and rougher civilization, regarding us barbaric in fact, and calling us in their hearts, if not in speech, ‘the foreign devils’” (1869, pp. 403–4). “Foreign devil” is a loose translation of the phrase “fan kwei lou,” meaning “foreign ghost fellow,” which was what mainland Chinese called all Western Europeans in that period (Anderson 1988, p. 97).

Other Americans tried to comprehend the Chinese through their food and work ethic, two aspects that were easily experienced and observable and about which Bowles wrote much. This may be why they ultimately failed in understanding the motivations of the Chinese immigrants of their day. Very few looked at Chinese immigration via the approach of Charles Brooks, U.S. consul to Japan, who, during the debate about the “Chinese Question,” testified to Congress in 1877 that “the only way to understand a people was to first learn their religion. When you learn the rules that govern their actions you can judge them, and you can judge whether they are influenced according to their belief” (Memorial, p. 39). In this way, the joss house, as a center of religious expression for Chinese-American immigrants, becomes the lens through which to observe their behavior.

As the Chinese of that period left few records of their own for modern historians to study, the English records of Caucasian observers are often the only contemporary sources available to understand the experience of Chinese immigrants during the 1800s, including the ubiquitous joss house, the religious center for the Chinese in the United States. While the authors of the time described the buildings in language of mystery and superstition, a joss house is simply a Taoist temple. The name “joss house” reportedly is derived from an anglicized corruption of the Portuguese word “deus,” meaning “god” (Weaverville Joss House 2007). As places of worship, this explanation as a “house of god” seems logical, but other sources show that “joss” is a common name for the incense and paper offerings burned in Taoist ceremonies and traditional ancestor worship, making it literally a “house of incense” (Pu 2006). The latter theory seems most logical, as Bowles wrote

in 1869 that “joss” is pronounced “josh,” which does not sound at all like the Portuguese pronunciation of “deus” (p. 406).

Contemporary descriptions and surviving joss houses show that most followed the same architectural format. The exterior was usually an interesting blend of a typical Western wood false-front vernacular and Chinese decoration; inside, the worship space was crowned with a gilded altar featuring images of common Taoist figures and, if the joss house served immigrants from a specific region of China, their local deities. Surrounding rooms served as living quarters, kitchens, and stores where traditional Chinese foods were sold, making the joss house not only a place of worship but also a center for social life. The buildings were built and maintained through donations from the Chinese community (Weaverville Joss House 2007). Two notable joss houses still exist: one in Weaverville, California, dating from 1874, and the other in Evanston, Wyoming, which is an accurate reconstruction of the original that was built in 1870 and burned to the ground in 1922 (Wyoming Genealogy). San Francisco was the headquarters of the six largest Chinese immigration companies and had the highest concentration of joss houses in the country.

Offerings to spirits of ancestors and deities were the most common form of joss house worship. Returning to Bowles, he wrote:

On their holidays, or occasions of death or departure of friends, they worship, in a cheap, sentimental way, various graven images in their little “Josh” Houses, that are, in style and ornament, an exaggeration of the ruder chapels among the ignorant Romish peasantry. These “Josh” Houses are not numerous, but seem to be run on commercial principles for whoever can own or control them. There are no public gatherings in them,—no forms of public worship,—only individual offerings of gifts to the gods,—or their owners,—with the burning of candles, and similar childish rites. . . . There is no fanaticism in it,—no appreciable degree of earnestness about it. (1869, pp. 406–7)

The Christian Recorder published this description of one of the San Francisco joss houses:

The first figure that is to be seen is at the head of the last flight of stairs, and is called the Guardian of the temple, of the Goodman. He has a laughing countenance, and is attired in a light robe and head covering. Every worshiper entering the temple places the ends of his fingers together, and with his hands before his breast propitiates [sic] this idol by bowing three times and mumbling a prayer at the same time. Each figure, or group of figures, is covered by a rich canopy of silk in a frame or box of carved wood in some cases richly ornamented with gold and silver. Passing from the Guardian of the Temple to another part of the temple, we reached the

“Trinity”—Fire, Air, and Water. The first named has a very red face, long black whiskers and a very determined look. . . . The faces and other parts of the body visible are made of wood or papier mache, and are never as dark as the complexions of the Chinese. . . . The worshiper, male or female, propitiates each of these figures, the object being to ward off destruction or injury by the three elements. (Anonymous 1875)

A citizen of Evanston, Wyoming, described the joss house there:

All wore their queues in that day, and all worshipped at the Joss House. This and the Masonic Temple were the most imposing buildings in Chinatown. There was a two-story porch in front of the Joss House, and a flag pole on the roof. The door was flanked with carved panels and within hung many banners and richly embroidered draperies. Behind the gates of carved teakwood was an elaborate altar, on which fragrant Joss sticks burned before their idol, whose placid face looked out from between deeply carved wooden panels covered with gilt. (Wyoming Genealogy)

As the cultural ignorance of these writers leaves us with only a very small part of the larger picture of joss house worship, and since most joss houses did not survive the twentieth century to be studied, it is difficult to accurately interpret the reality behind their observances. For example, the account from the *Christian Recorder* describes a female statue as “the goddess of the prostitute,” which was probably a representation of the female deity Nǚwa, the traditional creator of humanity and first mother of the Chinese people. Or it could have been Baijie, the Widow Martyr, who was deified as the personification of feminine virtue, depending on the region of China its worshippers came from (Bryson 2016).

To understand the function of a joss house in the nineteenth century Chinese American experience, we must go beyond the physical characteristics of the buildings and explore their social significance. The philosophy of Chinese culture dictated practically every decision immigrants made in the United States. During the Q’ing Dynasty, which lasted from 1636 to 1912 and encompassed the majority of Chinese immigration to the U.S., Chinese culture was built upon centuries of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist philosophies, mixed in with regional folk religions and magical practice. Buddhism was a religion of foreign origin, migrating north and east from India. While many American observers wrote that the Chinese were Buddhists, their descriptions of Chinese worship actually illustrate Taoist practices (Bowles 1869). Brooks was careful to distinguish between Buddhism and Taoism, which he called Fung Shuy after one aspect of Taoist practice (Memorial 1877).

Taoism, from the word “tao” meaning “the Way,” focuses on behavioral cultivation to align oneself with the Mandate of Heaven. Confucianism

likewise is a philosophy of self-cultivation but with an emphasis on filial piety, which in its simplest form means respect for parents, but in practice it extends toward elder brothers, grandparents, the family name as a whole, and to the Emperor (Mengzi 1970). Many of the questions asked by Americans about the Chinese in the nineteenth century can be answered from this single doctrine, including their patriotism (piety towards the emperor), their seeming inability to acculturate (piety toward their family heritage), and preference to leave the U.S. to return to their family with the honor associated with riches (piety toward the family name). The three philosophies—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism—were synthesized into a general Chinese folk religion with each doctrine practiced to varying degrees depending on the region (Cohen and Jaw 1977).

With the rise of the Q'ing, religious reforms were forced through the early eighteenth century due to the emperor's suspicion of organized religion and the perceived tendency of the Taoist clergy to be made up of criminals hiding from the law. The Q'ing government imposed strict regulations on Taoism and Buddhism, licensing all clergy and requiring state supervision of religious activity (Smith 2015). Simultaneously, the Chinese began migrating to other parts of the world. The cause of the massive emigration out of China during the 1800s was complicated: The Q'ing Dynasty saw a population explosion concurrent with devastating deforestation and flooding, along with a downturn in technological development, which, by the nineteenth century, created a massive population of poor Chinese who found no hope for prosperity in their homeland (Anderson 1988). The first notable group of Chinese immigrants arrived in California in 1849, just in time for the Gold Rush, with a total of 325 individuals. The numbers peaked in 1852 with 20,026 arrivals, then fell off until the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad in 1868 caused another increase (Zo 1978).

These immigrants, mostly laboring men, came for a variety of reasons, some by choice due to their economic situation and others by force as prisoners of war; the Hakka War of 1854–68 provided a considerable number of prisoners who were sent to the Caribbean and Central and South America (Ibid.). The Chinese entering the U.S. for the most part entered by their own free will, but the Coolie (slave) trade of other countries tainted the image of the Chinese population. Despite the stigma, these immigrants saw a chance not only to improve their finances but their religious standing, as returning to China as a wealthy man brought honor to the family name, fulfilling the requirements of filial piety (Ibid.).

The ideals of filial piety, plus the practicality of living and worshiping with people of similar thought and upbringing, meant the Chinese formed

into societies based on their place of origin, usually by city or province. Weaverville had four companies organized in this way, called Yong-Wa, Se-Yep, Neng-Yong, and Sam-Yep (Quimby 1913). It is notable that while the Chinese organized socially and politically in a disparate manner, religiously they were more united. Weaverville and Evanston each had a single joss house that was shared between the many Chinese factions, but this was not always the case. San Francisco's Chinatown hosted several independent joss houses of varying importance, and the priests from each were reported to give periodic blessings over the communal furnace where documents were burned (Quimby 1913).

Reported memorials from American observers insisted that these immigrants did not include religious leaders or clergy of any sort. Reverend A.W. Loomis of the Presbyterian Board of Missions, who served Chinese communities both in California and China, wrote: "No priests or teachers of religion or any of their religious sects have come to California as teachers" (Memorial 1877, p. 4). Bowles recorded that "neither their families or priests follow them . . . here" (1869, p. 397). Of course, some form of leadership was necessary to operate the temples, as the temple keepers were often a dedicated, hereditary position, although with no requirement for formal training (Cohen 1977). One source claims the keeper of the Evanston joss house was an annual position, and a new keeper was selected during the New Year celebration by launching a wooden ball on a rocket and seeing who would catch it, suggesting that little religious training or experience was necessary to manage the temples (Wyoming Genealogy). These comments may stem from the fact that to a Westerner the Taoist clergy, if they can be called that as their duties were fundamentally different from their Christian counterparts, was not visibly distinguishable from the general Chinese population as Christian clergy were from the U.S. population at the time.

While the limits of the historical record leave much to be desired, it is apparent that Brooks was correct in his belief that an understanding of a people's religion is necessary to understand a people's motivation. Upon understanding the spiritual practices of the nineteenth-century Chinese, their formerly enigmatic nature is demystified through the joss house, the American development of the Taoist temples they left behind in their homeland. As a tangible reflection of Chinese devotion, the joss house reveals the motivations for the cultural divide that the "mysterious and superstitious people" maintained with their host country that plagued American sociologists and historians for decades. The "ghostly feeling" mentioned by the *Christian Recorder* no longer surrounds them.

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Half the Sky, or Half a Lie? Unfulfilled Promises to Women in Republican China

by Rachel Finlayson

“Train quickly to become the vanguard of the people, To wipe away the old ways. . . . Accomplish the Socialist Revolution, you great women!”

(Croll 1978, p. 132)

Introduction to Chinese Feminism in Republican China

When the Qing dynasty fell in 1912, Chinese nationalist and communist forces fought to gain power. Both groups looked to build their base of support among the socially repressed, which included women and peasants. Thus, women’s emancipation became a central issue, and it remained primary until 1924, during an era known as the May Fourth Movement (Lan and Fong 1999, p. ix). Nationalist and communist forces both promised women better lives, in terms of education, love in marriage, value in family life, a role in the revolution and social activism, and emancipation. Mao Zedong summarized the enthusiasm of the time with the statement “women hold up half the sky!” It was a time of upheaval for all of China but particularly for women.

Verbal support for women’s emancipation did help political leaders to garner support during the revolution, including recruiting women for the Long March, factory production, and other political causes. Despite much talk of women’s equality during the early and mid-1900s, women never became “comrades of equal rank” within the party hierarchy during Mao’s lifetime and were often criticized for “placing feminist goals above Communist wartime priorities” (Wolf 1985, p. 16; Coser 1986, p. 992). Communist Chinese politicians used feminism as a political tool to galvanize support but never intended to truly promote long-term gender equality.

Theoretical Foundation and Background

Three theoretical ideas serve as the primary basis for this research: First, deception is a form of corruption and an abuse of power. Next, individuals join political movements because of personal incentives, and finally, the support of women is necessary to win a war.

While corruption can be difficult to define, it can broadly be delineated as “wrongful exercise of public duty in any community.” This public duty is determined by “standards of behaviour that are required to be observed by public officials” (Philp 1997). Intentional failure to follow through on political promises is deception, and, therefore, a form of corruption and an abuse of power.

The second is essentially a form of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory attributes participation in political revolution to competing sanctions, rewards, and norms, often independent of cultural influences or historical institutions (Brittanica Academic). Rational choice theorists assert that political movements “cannot assume automatic mobilization based on pre-given loyalties;” instead, they must work to generate “commitment to their cause and to their chosen means of reaching their goals.” (Hirsch 1986, p. 384) Indeed, no rational actor would choose to participate in a political revolution or any kind of collective good “unless selective incentives persuade them to do so” (Klandermans 2001). We must assume that women act as individuals interested in their own political survival. Women may have contributed to the Chinese Civil War because they wanted to “claim more complete female citizenship and increased postwar equality” (Jensen 2008, p. xi). Thus, we begin to understand the choice to try to mobilize women through this lens. Women required a reason to be involved, and political emancipation fulfilled that need.

Other pertinent theories describe the necessity of female support in political upheaval. In wartime, women are needed for economic, social, and organizational reasons. The mobilization of a nation for war generates “direct needs for women’s labor in industry, agriculture, and the military,” as well as “organizational skills in voluntary organizations and management” (Jensen 2008, p. viii). Indeed, even Woodrow Wilson stated the necessity of female support; he worried that “women . . . might constitute a subversive element in the nation, detrimental to wartime unity and the smooth functioning of selective service” (Kennedy 1999, p. 4). It is clear that women are generally thought to be necessary to the functioning of war or political movements, either because of their potential as a source of support or at the very least to avoid subversion. Thus, it is clear why women would be an appealing source of support for burgeoning political groups as the Qing dynasty fell.

There also exists literature that explains the starting position of women when the Qing dynasty fell. In the early 1900s, the state of women was bleak. Daughters were killed or sold as child brides or caretakers for infant husbands (Young 2001, p. 134). Chinese women were completely helpless with regard to education, choice in marriage, or basic freedoms. Investment in female education was considered wasteful. One Chinese woman recalled, “Women had no status. They were at the lowest level of society, doing household chores, home labor” (Ibid., p. 135). Many men languished indoors and smoked opium, while women were left with heavy agricultural and household work. Despite this, women did not have property rights or political opportunities (Ibid., p. 156).

At age seven or eight, girls’ feet would be bound. One woman recalled that she had once been an active child, but after her foot binding, “my free and optimistic nature vanished . . . my feet felt on fire and I couldn’t sleep; Mother struck me for crying. . . . I tried to hide but was forced to walk on my feet . . .” (Croll 1978, p. 19). Women were considered nameless or non-existent. When the men of the house were absent, women at home would reply to visitors “‘no, there’s nobody in’—given by the housewife herself!” (Ibid., p. 18). Another woman explained, “One time I was told to go to a [Communist Party] women’s meeting. At the meeting they asked what my name was. I said, ‘I don’t have a name.’ I never had a name before that!” (Young 2001, p. 138) As the Chinese Nationalist Party and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, the state of women was ripe for change; the rhetoric of the CCP had an almost intoxicating appeal. The stage was set for the recruitment of women, and I will explain how women were recruited and whether promises made during recruitment were kept.

Qualitative Findings

Commitment

The promises the communist and nationalist leadership made to women, or in other words, ways the communist and nationalist leadership committed to emancipate women fall under five main categories: love in marriage and family, a role in the revolution, women’s education, emancipation, and social activism. These commitments are reflected in the following excerpt from the First National Party Congress in 1924: “In law, in commerce, in education and in society, the principle of equality between the two sexes shall be recognized and the development of rights of women was to be promoted” (Croll 1978, p. 122). Similarly, the First Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931, stated: “It is the purpose of the Soviet government of China to guarantee the thorough emancipation of women; it recognizes

freedom of marriage and will put into operation various measures for the protection of women, to enable women gradually to attain to the material basis required for their emancipation from the bondage of domestic work, and to give them the possibility of participating in the social, economic, political, and cultural life of the entire society” (Young 2001, p. 255).

Women’s rights pertaining to love in marriage were prominently discussed by many top CCP leaders. For instance, in 1916, the future secretary of the CCP, Chen Duxiu, wrote a piece in the revolutionary publication *New Youth* criticizing traditional Confucian mores. He claimed: “The fundamental principle of economic production is individual independence . . . the independence of the individual . . . and the independence of property in the economic field bear witness to each other” (Lan and Fong 1999, p. 5). He claimed that as long as traditional China remained, women would not be heard outside of their homes and would be controlled by men.

Yun Daiying also wrote about women and marriage, claiming that “husbands and wives should have the freedom to divorce if they feel that divorce is necessary” (Ibid., p. 31). Yun argued for emancipation, writing that “when women are completely emancipated, have economic independence, and do not suffer from domestic burdens,” they will not have to rear children solely to “avoid scorn” (Ibid., p. 32). Like Chen, Yun spoke of an emancipated society for women contingent upon economic freedom. Ye Shengtao (eventual communist vice-minister of education) and Wang Huiwu (legal committee member of the Central Government) also wrote about the necessity of liberating women from abusive and constrictive marriages in order to achieve emancipation. Other revolutionary writers, such as Lu Xun, Zhang Weici, B.E. Lee, Lu Qiuxin, Tang Jicang, and Yang Zhihua also penned essays that suggested to women there was to be a new society based on new ideology that gave women rights.

Mao himself wrote several papers about the status of and discrimination against women, giving women a reason to hope. He wrote a few papers about one Miss Zhao, who committed suicide en route to an arranged marriage she could not accept. As she was carried to the home of her future in-laws, she took a razor from her stocking and slit her own throat. Of this incident, Mao wrote, “Although Miss Zhao lived for twenty-one years in a family that did not allow her to have a personality, . . . in that last brief moment . . . her personality suddenly came forth . . . the snow-white knife was stained with fresh red blood . . . with this, Miss Zhao’s personality also gushed forth suddenly, shining bright and luminous” (Ibid., p. 80). Mao’s writing suggests that the abolition of tradition could allow women to have both freedom and personality and, if not the former, an honorable death as a martyr for the cause of freedom. Mao also

wrote of this event, “There is only one general answer, that men and women are extremely segregated, that women are not allowed a place in society. . . . How could Miss Zhao have done anything else but commit suicide? Alas for Miss Zhao! Alas for the evils of society!” (Ibid., pp. 87–88). He published several essays relevant to women’s rights, particularly articles that sensationalized the death of Miss Zhao.

Other leadership published works focused on women’s education and employment. Deng Enming, a founder of the Jinan communist cell, wrote: “Ever since the new tide of thought swept over China, the woman question has received a great deal of attention . . . [but] how is female education in Jinan, the cultural center of Shandong?” (Ibid., p. 136). The rest of his piece evaluates the quality of schools, faculty, curriculum, and administration. As with other champions of women’s education at the time (Deng Chunlan, Xiang Jingyu, Tao Yi, Bing Xin, Wang Jingwei, and Shao Lizi), Deng publicized the communist commitment to female education and reform.

In terms of female emancipation, communist leaders of the time aimed to transform women’s lives through education and employment (Lan and Fong, p. 147). Lu Yin, a well-known writer and May Fourth activist of the time, sang the praises of constructing a Women’s Improvement Society in order to help women to have a consciousness and employable skills. May Fourth advocate Zhou Zuoren claimed that emancipating Chinese women was essential to modernizing China (Ibid., p. 148).

Why Women Were Needed

There would not have been any purpose in recruiting women for reasons were they not important in winning the revolutionary cause. Mao Zedong himself stated that women “form a vast reserve of labour power which should be tapped in the struggle to build a great socialist country” (Croll 1978, p. 238). The Communist Party formally adopted a resolution regarding women, saying, “efforts must be made to increase women Party members and to develop leaders for the women’s movement” (Ibid., p. 127). From 1920 to 1925, there was a massive mobilization of women in Shanghai, Beijing, and southern China. After this occurred, women were so numerous that “neither party could ignore them,” particularly the Communist Party as it sought to foment class consciousness and mobilize large swaths of the population (Edwards 2008, p. 141). Women were intent upon “ensuring that each party’s political machinery did not use women’s rights as . . . a bargaining chip to win other political goals” (Ibid.).

In order to win support from political women, CCP leaders chose to participate in and integrate with existing women’s organizations. As a

result, “prominent male CCP members became active in publishing and making speeches to women through the existing channels,” as seen by the speeches and publications mentioned previously (Edwards 2008, p. 144). The CCP also formed a women’s rights league and hoped such a women’s committee could “encourage participation from women” (Ibid.). In other words, the CCP was attempting to “arouse and organize women as a separate category” (Croll 1978, p. 121). He Xiangning, a Central Executive Committee member, described the Women’s Department as “drafting women into active participation in the Revolution,” which internally defined women’s issues as secondary to the goals of socialism (Ibid., p. 123). American journalist Anna Louise Strong interviewed girl propagandists who traveled with the nationalist army to organize women. One explained to her that the girls would “explain first the difference between the northern troops and our revolutionary forces. We tell them we came to save them from oppression . . .” (Ibid., p. 128).

As a result, women joined and supported the CCP in droves. They joined the Long March and helped by working in factories, publishing writings, and mobilizing their families. There are stories of women enlisting in the Red Army, “leaving children behind with peasant families, crossing glacier mountains in the third trimester . . . leaving babies where they were born, or carrying them along a day or two after birth (Young 2001, p. 131). Women sacrificed a great deal to support the party.

Female Motives

Generally speaking, women believed their social and political standing would be different if there was a revolution. One poster pasted in a wall in Hubei read, “We women of Hubei for several thousand years have suffered under political, economic and legal oppression. Propriety, traditions, and all sorts of social customs have bound us. Long ago we lost our rights as humans. . . . Now that the revolution has extended to Hubei, and the national government committees have come, we want to welcome them, because they are the people’s officials, because they have given the people freedom from suffering, and because they seek the people’s good. . . . We believe that they will give us economic and political equality with the men, that they will revise the unequal laws, and that they will do away with all laws that harm or hinder women, and will protect the rights of women. . . . This government can help women to have utter equality, economically, politically and legally with the men. Fellow women of Hubei! This is our chance . . .” (Croll 1978, p. 129). The daughter of an official, Xie Bingying, related that one of her classmates made a speech saying: “Since the government gave an equal

chance to the girls, enabling us to work for the nation and for society, it has been a blessing to women” (Ibid., p. 132). Clearly, women believed they had a chance to change their circumstances through the revolution.

The revolution created hope among women. One revolutionary named Li Yanfa explained why she joined the army: “To go find food to eat. There was no food at home. . . . I carried pails of water on a shoulder pole for the five families [and my in-laws]. . . . They fed the dog sweet potato leaves mixed with the rice that had stuck to the pot and some water. After the dog ate, I would eat what was left” (Young 2001, p. 137) For many, the revolution represented a chance at recognition and societal legitimacy, an excuse to be unsubmissive and independent, and finally, an opportunity to seek “freedom from exploitation and abuse at home, the hope of escape from the chaos of poverty into the safety of a secure, regimented environment with enough food to eat. . . . A way to avoid marrying into a strange family or remaining an unmarried, unpaid worker on the lowest rung of the family ladder . . . for the educated and educable, it was an exciting way to fight for social justice and work for national sovereignty” (Ibid., pp. 131, 133, 138)

Women also supported the revolution because they felt that there would be “revolutionary change in gender politics led by the new government’s policies” (Edwards 2008, p. 177). Women in Shanghai issued a manifesto similar to that in Hubei, crying, “If we really wish to free China and throw off the yoke of slavery, we must join in the grand revolutionary movement. We must not be passers-by . . . we must consider ourselves crusaders in the overthrow of imperialism and militarism. . . . Dear sisters be quick and join our revolutionary army” (Croll 1978, p. 116). Factory women stated, “We expect the Nationalist Government to make the factories have school for us to learn in and also a special room to feed babies in. And hospital care when we are sick, because we are too poor to pay a doctor. And also vacation with pay before and after babies are born” (Ibid., p. 143).

Failure to Deliver

While the CCP did allow women to join their ranks, both the CCP and nationalist governments ultimately failed to deliver on many of their promises. In the early CCP years, the government publicly tolerated women’s suffrage, but in private, many CCP officials had “strong reservations” (Edwards 2008, p. 148). However, many others saw communism as the “most important step towards women’s emancipation” and “a panacea for women’s problems” (Lan and Fong 1999, p. 184). Chen wrote, “We cannot divide the women question piecemeal, into issues of education, jobs, social interaction, etc., for our discussion. We must take socialism as our sole

guide” (Ibid, p. 217). He made similar statements when presenting before the Guangdong Federation of Women’s Circles, extolling the necessity of focusing upon socialism (Ibid., p. 184). The goal of communist leaders of the era was to liberate women from patriarchal domination, foot-binding, and home confinement but only as a byproduct of socialism (Ibid., p. 185). In this way, government leaders failed to make women’s emancipation a priority in a realistic way.

Indeed, most of the promises made regarding the future of women were inextricably tied to supporting socialism. In 1921, Chen argued that “the women question will be fundamentally resolved only when socialism arrives” (Edwards 2008, p. 147). While this assertion was made six months before the CCP was formed, it primed the pump for female support for the organization. By convincing women that emancipation from gender discrimination was tied to the success of socialism, they ensured support for their other political goals, without making the state of women a realistic priority.

Furthermore, there were times when Chinese governments acted in direct opposition to the rhetoric they had previously espoused. For example, in March 1912, the Provisional Constitution under Sun Yat-sen “implicitly excluded women” (Ibid., p. 67). When the United Front (the CCP and the Nationalist party together) formulated a national constitution in 1924, Article 14 within it dictated that only men be enfranchised (Lan and Fong 1999, p. xviii). After 1927, when relations between the two parties deteriorated, May Fourth feminist programs “lost their political backing” almost completely as parties did not want to risk further instability (Ibid., p. xxii). In 1943, the party decided not to discuss the social and political inequality of women, instead claiming that women must “make their own way by proving that they could contribute to production equally with men . . . [while bearing] the truly heavy burden of their traditional roles” (Wolf 1985, p. 17). Indeed, women who sought to maintain feminist dialogue were accused of “neglecting the class struggle” (Ibid.).

Chinese political leaders repeatedly made sure that feminism did not jeopardize primary goals; they saw it as a deviation and a tangent (Edwards 2008, pp. 141, 146). In 1927, the Women’s Bureau reported to the Central Executive Committee that the women’s movement would “not be much use in the real revolutionary battle front” (Ibid., p. 148). Communist women were instructed to “establish themselves at the center” of women’s organizations but to avoid being “absorbed” by them (Ibid., p. 145). Under the United Front, “priorities were clear. Revolution and a unified China first and women’s freedom second” (Croll 1978, p. 124). Women’s issues re-

ceived less support and attention from the government (Ibid., p. 144). This is perhaps due to the fact that women's involvement "antagonized" their husbands, and permitting foot-binding and spousal abuse was preferable to antagonizing "peasant supporters of the Red Army" (Cosser 1986, p. 992). The government prioritized the persuasion of the male community of CCP benefits instead (Wolf 1985, p. 19). As a result, when women's associations introduced daycare or intervened in forced child marriages, the director of the CCP women's movement openly criticized such associations "for placing feminist goals above Communist wartime priorities" (Cosser).

However, the motivation to include women in the social movements of the time was not purely for feminist reasons. One justification for providing education to women was to "liberate the individual energies of men," seeing as China could "never become strong while in each generation boyhood years were predominantly spent in the company of ignorant and crippled womanfolk" (Croll 1978, p. 45). Thus, it is no surprise that the CCP delayed female emancipation in a variety of ways after it came to power. One of these was divesting from predominantly female industries in the mid-1950s and instead promoting an ideal of the "socialist housewife"—a woman who "managed a household well, ensured harmony among family members, and brought up children conscientiously" (Bailey 2012, p. 112). Indeed, even as prominent women like Ding Ling led public relations and writing for the CCP and women were "interpolated into the new Maoist representational order," women still faced discriminatory treatment regarding sexual norms (Barlow 2004, p. 192).

This may not have been all completely conscious. The thoughts and behaviors of policymakers were deeply entrenched in patriarchy. When the particulars of land reforms were not completely apparent, cadres relied upon the status quo to fill in the blanks. Land ownership reforms dictated that women be equal before the law in owning land, but in practice, female land ownership actually became a new part of marriage negotiations. When women owned land, it remained difficult for her to "hire labor, sell, lease, or trade her land." If the woman instead wished to "trade her land for some in her new husband's village," the land became a *de facto* portion of her bride price. Some villages circumvented this baffling predicament by "simply refusing to give families any land allotments for unmarried girls," and "patrilineal, family-oriented traditions filled the gap of interpretation" (Johnson 2014, p. 112). Unfortunately, the CCP "failed to deal with the actual conditions and attitudes which held women in an inferior position" (Wolf 1985, p. 16).

Indeed, women were expected to fulfill both their revolutionary roles and their traditional duties. When activist Ding criticized this, she was told

her views were “now “outdated,” “harmful to unity,” and unnecessary . . . since “full sex-equality had already been established.” She was relieved of her political responsibilities for two years (Johnson 2014, p. 74) In essence, women were mobilized for production, but any woman who complained was accused of putting feminism before the struggle (Wolf 1985, p. 17). Women were encouraged to speak out against landlords, but specifically warned not to let women’s special problems “interfere,” and marriage reform was to be “mentioned and forgotten” while land reform work continued (Ibid., p. 18). Scholar Margery Wolf wrote, “Whatever women’s legal rights, their actual control over the means of production or even over their own bodies did not change . . . as a result of land reform” (p. 19). Finally, when the first Five Year Program was introduced, the role of women within it was mostly household work in “constructing a socialist society” (Ibid., p. 21)

Examples of delays in fulfilling the promises made to women during the rise of the CCP abound. In summary, there is no shortage of evidence that the CCP benefited from the support of women, yet it failed to deliver on the promises made to attract women in the first place.

Conclusion

From 1900 to 1976, the “women question” was a central point of debate in Chinese revolutionary politics. It was raised by the May Fourth movement and commonly discussed among government officials and both nationalist and communist revolutionaries. Such rhetoric galvanized and motivated women to be politically involved. However, women’s issues ultimately took a backseat to other socialist issues of the time. Just as communists allied with nationalists for a United Front from 1924 to 1927, the Chinese Communist Party ultimately viewed feminism as a necessity for a successful socialist revolution without having a real commitment to its principles (Edwards 2008, p. 141). Members within it, such as Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, truly believed in feminist principles. However, there were not sufficiently large numbers of government officials with this commitment to enact real change for the long term. For many officials, the “women question” was a positive externality that would be solved as a fruit of socialism. It appears that for most, “the chief and immediate aim of China” was “the achievement of national unity and national independence,” and women’s achievement could at best be a small part of such an achievement (Croll 1978, p. 121).

Despite the hardships that women suffered as activists in the revolution, few expressed “regrets over their initial decision to join the revolution” or awareness of the irony of escaping patriarchy under the Qing emperor only to experience it working tirelessly under nationalists and communists

(Young 2001, p. 140). It is important to recognize the improvements made under the Chinese Communist Party, even as it repeatedly sidestepped the gender question in later years. This trend, the repeated postponement of gender equality as a priority, ultimately determined the fate of the “women question” in China (Wolf 1985, p. 26). One must hope that in the coming years, governments around the world will have renewed commitment to gender equality and will resist the temptation to require women to sacrifice emancipation for so-called national goals.

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Ukiyo-e: How Patterns in Edo Culture Shaped “The Floating World”

by Vanessa Hall

Until the seventeenth century, it was exceedingly rare to find art depicting everyday Japanese life. It was only when artists began painting scenes from the street life in Yoshiwara, the red light district in the capital city of the time, that the popular school of art known as “Ukiyo-e,” a highly fashionable style of Japanese woodblock prints, was formed (J.E.L. 1914, pp. 1–4). Emerging from an era of Chinese philosophy that was against anything Japanese, early examples of Ukiyo-e were rare until Hishikawa Moronobu discovered a way to mass-produce the art through woodblock engraving prints, which ultimately established Ukiyo-e as a “popular school of art” (Ibid., p. 3). The idea behind Ukiyo-e ties back to the idea of *iki*, a Confucian principle describing an unassuming style without pretentiousness, while still observing pride and spirit and an awareness of the illusory nature of experience. According to Stuart Fleming of the University of Pennsylvania, Edo culture was an expression of the feelings of Ukiyo-e, to make the most out of life here and now. Fleming states how the overall mood of Japan at the time was to reject Buddhist ideas of life as a “sad, fleeting dream” and instead to “replace them with the desire to make the most of life, here and now” (1985, p. 61). Further, Fleming explains,

The Buddhist Ukiyo, meaning either “sad world” or “floating world” suffered a value transference, to equate to the troubled, earthly affairs of man as seen, in microcosm, in the pleasure districts. Gambling became popular and the winnings were invariably spent on women. Prostitutes of all kinds and classes, some even dressed as Buddhist

nuns, often used popular temples and shrines as areas to ply their trade. They mingled with countless dancers, actors, etc., to create a truly rich pageant of daily pleasure-seeking that cried out for expression via a richly-colored palette. Ukiyo-e artists did just that. (1985, p. 61)

When it came to the subject matter of the floating world, “no subject was too sacred or too profane for their purposes” (J.E.L. 1914, p. 1–4). With no constraints on subjects too outrageous or conservative, how did Ukiyo-e develop a standard in subject matter? Certain patterns of Edo culture contributed to the subject matter of the floating world, including participation in alternate attendance, the concept of *iki* as a result of sumptuary laws, and life in the pleasure quarters.

Alternate Attendance

During the Tokugawa rule (1603–1868), often called the Edo period in association with the capital city, the shogun (commander in chief of feudal Japan) required *daimyo* (lords) to leave their domains every other year in order to live near him in the capital Edo for a period of time, a practice known as alternate attendance. The shogun forced *daimyo* to leave their wives and children in Edo, which guaranteed good behavior and prevented war conspiracies. Alternate attendance was financially draining on the *daimyo*, as they had to support both a household in their domain and a residence in Edo. Aside from the political stability and leverage that alternate attendance provided the Tokugawa regime over the *daimyo*, it also spurred extensive economic growth, urbanization, and social change. Alternate attendance, in fact, created a national culture, which became the subject matter of Ukiyo-e art.

This cultural effect seemed to flow in a multi-directional pattern along the “metaphorical road of alternate attendance” (Vaporis 1997, p. 28). The *daimyo* and the “retainer” servants who accompanied them were actually the carriers of culture through their “consumption habits, use of material goods, as well as through their cultural activities in Edo and at home” (Fleming 1985, p. 60–61). Constantine Vaporis spent a year researching alternate attendance at the Kochi Prefectural Library. Vaporis explains the two-way direction of the cultural effect of alternate attendance as a process of retainers enriching the cultural life of their domains, having “been exposed to myriad new experiences during their periods of residence in Edo, including the largest commercial market in the country” and raising Japan’s cultural level. He continues, “Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize that ‘Edo culture’ was nothing less than an amalgam of continually changing influences from early modern Japan’s large number of domains,” and as a result Edo

was made into “cultural nexus,” a place where artists and scholars longed to be (1997, p. 66). Retainers accompanied the daimyo every other year to the capital, though their families were allowed to stay behind in the home domain, unlike the daimyo’s. As subjects to a compulsory system, the retainers either looked to their time away from family as a lonely burden or looked forward to their time away as a service opportunity.

Financial aid from the capital was available to retainers to incentivize participation in alternate attendance (Vaporis 1997, p. 33). Finances were important to a retainer’s stay in Edo, because it determined whether he would partake in Edo’s culture, including going out to eat or drink, attend plays, purchase goods for himself or for others, or become a student of a craft unavailable to him in his own region. These were things the retainers and daimyo could bring back to their regions—culture in the form of fine arts, goods, and skills; thereby spreading Edo’s culture from the capital to the rest of Japan.

The “Edo experience” included the journey to and from Edo as well as the time spent living in the capital. Vaporis explains that “the trip to Edo was a journey of discovery and through it [the retainer] and others like him were able to place their localities within the context of the collectivity of domains that was known as ‘Japan’” (1997, p. 37). Retainers often wandered off the roadways to Edo and made stops along the way, partaking in cultural events such as street performances, acrobatics, sightseeing, and participating in the activities offered in the pleasure quarters, a popular subject in Ukiyo-e. By transporting culture to and from Edo, retainers proved that Edo culture was not strictly unidirectional, just as the subject matter of Ukiyo-e is not (Vaporis 1997, p. 27). Rather, it is influenced by all facets of Edo culture and is neither too “profane” nor too “sacred” (J.E.L. 1914, p. 1–4). The retainers’ opportunity to bring back skills from Edo to their own region, as well as their experiences on the roads to Edo and around the pleasure quarters were major contributing factors to Ukiyo-e subject matter.

Iki: Sumptuary Laws

Throughout the Edo period a series of sumptuary regulations was passed to regulate the expression of ideas that posed a threat to morality, safety, and public decorum. Each social class was banned from the expression of certain ideas or behaviors deemed showy or inappropriate by the shogunate, such as ideas expressed in both oral and written word. Expression of ideas was limited in both published works and speech, on topics such as rumors, scandals, erotica, unconventional theories, or anything that would demean the Tokugawa rule.

As for the restrictions on appearance, the sumptuary laws limited the expenditure of wealth according to social class. Merchants of the time began to earn great fortunes and lived in a manner that rivaled the lifestyle of the *samurai* class. The sumptuary laws of the Tokugawa rule were enforced in order to create a distinction between classes, to maintain a type of Confucian system of morality and to encourage thrift and prudence. Because clothing could be used to overstep class boundaries, the government placed a series of fashion-related precedents on clothing and accessories, which extended to many of the behaviors and lifestyles of the time. The sumptuary laws, in essence, were more to control the visual aspects related to social status and to enforce a measure of frugality appropriate to each social class. Each class was limited regarding excessive spending as to not appear above their social class. Citizens were required to live according to their social position, and failure to live and spend in a manner appropriate to one's social position meant failing to fulfil one's social obligations.

From the sumptuary laws came the concept of *iki*, which spurred a prominent pattern within Ukiyo-e. *Iki* is defined as a sentiment appealing to new aesthetics of sensuality, while simultaneously having a sense of morals, enjoying luck, and holding a strong contempt for money (Frederic 2002). *Iki* exemplifies simplicity, sophistication, spontaneity, and originality. *Iki* is ephemeral, romantic, straightforward, measured, audacious, yet not overly refined or pretentious, nor is it complicated or showy. It is used to express human appreciation of natural beauty—in other words the nature of human beings. *Iki* resists the boundaries of overly specific rules about what is considered uncouth or even vulgar. Citizens of the Tokugawa period lived within *iki* while still overcoming the restrictive laws by flaunting their excessive wealth through pattern designs in clothing. Textile decoration was one of the few ways to imply one's wealth without going beyond the sumptuary laws. William Watson of the University of London explains that the sumptuary laws passed in 1682–83 did little to stop technical development, and as a result, “if the law forbade ostentation by large motifs in ornament, there could be less objection to the elaboration of unobtrusive detail” (1984, p. 660).

Researchers of Ukiyo-e have cited sumptuary laws for artistic content as a large influence on Ukiyo-e. For example, in 1800 around the time of Kansei, a sub-era of the Tokugawa period, prints with bust portraits showing only the head and shoulders were banned as conspicuous (Fiorillo 2001). In 1793, prints that portrayed women who did not identify as prostitutes of the upper class were banned as well, in an attempt to maintain social divergence by preserving the reputations of women who were not actually prostitutes, such as *geisha* and waitresses working in tea houses (Ibid.). Other restric-

tions on printing included the number of colors used on prints, since the more colors used the more expensive it was to print, displaying the apparent wealth of the commissioner. Sumptuary laws also restricted the use of mica powder, which added a glittering, golden effect to the background of prints, in an ostentatious style, as another way the commissioner could flaunt his wealth. Despite these restrictions, artists still found a way to display wealth through the patterns they used in the clothing featured in paintings and mass-produced prints. The more intricate the pattern of the clothing, the more the print cost. The more the print cost, the more wealth was displayed, ultimately working around the sumptuary laws.

An example of working around the sumptuary laws through fashion is found in Suzuki Harunobu's *Girl Viewing Plum Blossoms at Night* (Fig. 1). Harunobu features a beautiful woman, reminiscent of the pleasure quarters, in full color and with a large amount of black negative space. He uses delicate, fragile curves against a powerful geometric setting to make the woman stand out. Other compositions in the painting (e.g., the bridge) are minimal and are based on opposing diagonals that also point to the woman. What stands out about the woman is her dress and the elegant, ornate details of her kimono, which are seemingly a standard pattern. Yet this pattern showcased wealth in spite of *iki*, with three patterns displayed throughout the kimono: delicate stripes and polka dots in a subdued, yet saturated pink, and an insignia of a bird placed over the stripe pattern. The use of three patterns showcases the deliberate time spent to create the intricate details of the cloth in order to display wealth even amidst the regulations on art during the time. Harunobu spent an excessive amount of time working on the woman's dress, carving intricate details into the woodblock so that when reproductions were created, the details would show through and display the wealth the artist flaunted in a covert fashion.

Life in the Pleasure Quarters

Most women depicted in Ukiyo-e prints were associated with the floating world, a world derived from the concept of the illusory nature of life and that often went hand in hand with the pleasure quarters. In Edo culture, there were a few types of women associated with the floating world, including geisha (performers), waitresses, common prostitutes (unlicensed or government licensed), and courtesans (prostitutes with upper-class clients). Pleasure quarters with beautiful women were popular in Ukiyo-e art, because the ephemeral beauty of these women and the carnal lifestyle associated with the floating world was a popular preference among the daimyo and their company.

Differentiating between the various women of the floating world could be difficult, as explained by Sarah Thompson of the Philadelphia Museum of Arts. Often the social status of a female in Japanese prints would be determined by their costumes, with a woman of pleasure made identifiable by her *obi* (sash) tied in the front. Geisha and tea house waitresses had their obi tied in the back, which could make it difficult to differentiate between them and ordinary women (Thompson 1986, p. 14). The floating world was a world of transitory pleasure favored by the merchant class, where they spent the most money and had the most fun. Since the merchant class frequented the pleasure quarters, they became patrons of the floating world, commissioned paintings of the pleasure quarters, and were a large source of the popularity and growth of Ukiyo-e. As merchants, they were limited to a lower class by the sumptuary laws, so they turned to pleasure seeking rather than flaunting their wealth. Donald Jenkins, curator of Asian art at the Portland Art Museum, affirms that as merchants were low in status and played no large role in public affairs, they focused instead on trade and pleasure. “Nowhere was the quest for pleasure more in evidence than in the floating world of the amusement quarters that became such distinctive features of Japanese cities at the time,” where the townspeople could satisfy their taste for pleasure (1988, p. 246).

As the pleasure quarters gained popularity among the merchant class, so did Ukiyo-e paintings and prints of the same subject, as the merchant class commissioned paintings of this favorite pastime. One example of pleasure quarters Ukiyo-e art is a piece by Hishikawa Moronobu, *Scene from the Pleasure Quarters* (Fig. 2). This particular piece features a group of women of pleasure, obvious from their dress (no obi tied in the back, obvious from the figure whose back faces the viewer on the far left). Moronobu uses lines thick and thin, fluid and hooking, flowing diagonally and creating movement through the women and their clothing, and moving toward the flowers in the upper left-hand corner. He uses a variety of contrasts in his lines to create a dynamic rhythm for the figures through the use of curvilinear lines juxtaposed against straight diagonals. The dynamic rhythm moves the eye through each figure, putting the focus on the women of pleasure, effectively making them the subject of the painting. We know that the women depicted in the floating world were most often courtesans or geisha and promoted the entertainment of the pleasure quarters. This painting depicts such women, as proven by the entertainment displayed, including performance of an instrument by both a woman and a man. Geisha entertainment usually included musical instruments, as geisha were more performers than prostitutes and did not rely on sex as prostitutes did. The

presence of the instrument concludes that the women in this painting are likely to be geisha, who were accompanied by professional musicians who worked at the geisha house, just like the man in this painting. The presence of a male musician, coupled with the way their sashes are tied, leads to the conclusion that these women of pleasure are geisha.

Conclusion

With almost endless possibilities of subjects that could have been depicted in Ukiyo-e, it was the patterns in Edo culture that shaped the prints into depictions of the floating world. The national culture created through alternate attendance flowed between Edo and the retainers, a culture of consumption, carnal desire, and aestheticism shown in Ukiyo-e. Both culture within the bounds of the sumptuary laws limiting lavish ornamentation and the incorporation of a subtly ostentatious *iki*, appreciation of natural aestheticism, flourished in Ukiyo-e. *Iki* resisted the boundaries of overly specific rules by overstepping class restrictions through art, while carnal desire and the pursuit of pleasure strongly influenced the definition of the floating world through reflecting elements of the pleasure quarters.

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


Figure 1. Suzuki Harunobu, *Girl Viewing Plus Blossoms at Night*, 1760 ca.



Figure 2. Hishikawa Moronobu, *Scene from the Pleasure Quarters*, 1690 ca.

Confucius Institutes: Expelling a Trojan Horse or Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth?

by Michael J. Swain

Introduction

During the past ten years, China has actively promoted its Confucius Institute (CI), a program of instruction in Chinese language and culture for college students outside of China. The program's stated purpose is to meet an existing demand for education in Chinese language and culture, with the intent of strengthening relationships between China and other countries in order to promote a more harmonious world. However, many have viewed the CI program as nothing more than an expansion of Beijing's soft power. Some Western institutions have even expelled CIs from their campuses. The growing concern suggests that China's offering of what appears to be a generous gift may instead be a Trojan horse. Interested college students are left to wonder whether attending a CI will be detrimental to their academic freedom or whether those who criticize the CI program are merely looking a gift horse in the mouth.

Confucius Institutes and Their Global Appeal

In 2004, China announced its first CI in Seoul, Korea. The CIs are not unlike France's Alliance Française, Germany's Goethe Institute, and Spain's Cervantes Institute (Hanban n.d.). The CIs are funded by Hanban, a nonprofit organization in Beijing with ties to the Chinese government (Starr 2009, p. 70), and seek to embody the economic and cultural cooperation Beijing extends to the global community. Through the CI program, high merit students from across the world may study in China on scholarship.


Most universities with a CI also have a joint relationship with a college in China that shares study abroad programs. Each university with a CI receives funding of roughly US\$100,000 for five years, along with research opportunities (Ibid., p. 71).

China’s CI proposal is hard for any university to turn down. Not only does Hanban offer complete funding for a Chinese language program covering both teachers and textbooks but also offers stronger ties to a growing economic world power. The potential for enhanced economic stature is an incentive to both large and small countries—from the UK to Kenya (Wheeler 2014, p. 54). The privileges that come with assisting China’s mission to gain ground economically and culturally include resources from Hanban for teaching Mandarin to the rising generation—as Mandarin becomes a major global language—as well as opportunities for increased economic relations with China (“Canadian Teachers Oppose” 2013, p. 20). There are currently 449 CIs around the world, created during the eleven years since China’s international cultural initiative began in 2004, and the U.S. hosts ninety-seven of the 449.

Confucius Institutes Fail to Meet the Rubric of Hanban’s First General Principle

According to Figure 1, it appears that interest in Chinese language and culture is growing (Hanban n.d.). Over the last decade the demand for Chinese study abroad programs increased tremendously, and at the same time the number of Chinese language programs from primary to higher education has also increased dramatically (Swofford 2015). Hanban’s CIs are an extension of Beijing’s interest in this growth. Although there are many dimensions of the recent demand for Chinese language and culture, the opinion of many Western academics is that the CIs do not adequately meet this rising demand,

Figure 1. The yearly increase in U.S. study abroad students in China from 1996 to 2013 showing massive growth (Swofford, 2015).



particularly in view of Hanban's first general principle stated in the CI Constitution and By-Laws:

Confucius Institutes devote themselves to *satisfying the demands* of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to *enhancing understanding* of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to *strengthening educational and cultural* exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world. (emphasis added)

Hanban's first general principle places major emphasis on the dissemination of Chinese culture and language to facilitate cooperation and friendly relations between China and the rest of the world. This implies that Chinese language and culture instruction within the CIs aims ultimately to facilitate better relations globally; however, the concern is that as long as these relations appear to be improving, the Beijing-funded Chinese language institutions do not have an obligation or incentive to improve educational quality. That said, a true analysis of CI and its aims can be accomplished by reviewing the qualifications of the CI instructors as to whether they "satisfy the demands" of those who "learn the Chinese language" and "enhance understanding of the Chinese language and culture."

The teachers at the CIs are primarily undergraduate student volunteers from China who want to study outside of China (Starr 2009, p. 78). This situation poses a number of problems, especially because these volunteers receive no prior education on how to approach the demographic they are hired to teach (Wheeler 2014, p. 59). Furthermore, these volunteers lack the pedagogical skills to teach foreign students, who learn Chinese much differently than the way CI teachers would have learned in China (Hua and Wei 2014, p. 98). If the aim of the CI program is to spread an understanding of Chinese culture and facilitate cultural exchange, the only way to achieve this objective is to provide CI teachers with training on how to understand and reach their intended audience.

One example of the problems associated with inexperienced and unprepared teachers is the instruction of stroke order for Chinese characters. Outside of mainland China, elementary-school-age to high-school-age Chinese students learn disciplined stroke order while attending complementary schools, weekend school, and after-school institutions for Chinese language instruction. However, in mainland China, the rise of keyboard-based word processing and computer-assisted writing curricula has taken the place of teacher-directed handwriting instruction, resulting in less em-

phasis on disciplined stroke order. Because writing is less frequently taught and practiced in mainland China, CI teachers do not necessarily have the skills to teach foreigners how to write Chinese characters, and CI students who learned traditional stroke order in grade school perceive the CI instructors as lacking credibility (Ibid., p. 334). This perception has led to recurring incidents of student disruptions and skepticism as to the integrity of class materials and teacher competency. Examples of student disruption include cases of laughing and calling attention to a CI teacher’s sloppy handwriting or incorrect stroke order. In one such circumstance, the CI students were scolded and instructed to not copy the correct characters from each other but to copy from the teacher’s incorrect characters on the board (Ibid., p. 337).

Increasing and extensive disruptions have led to a form of discrimination towards and even a temporary ban on ethnic Chinese students in some CI settings. A further portrayal of this ethnic Chinese discrimination is noted by the *Confucius Institute* magazines, which primarily features “white, Western bodies” (Ibid., p. 334). Hanban has also reportedly refused to publish activity photos (which Hanban requests from each CI), because the photos have a high proportion of foreign-born Asians (Schmidt 2013, p. 654). Dismissing the Chinese diaspora is also evident with successful secondary Chinese schools throughout the world that are ignored by leaders in Beijing, who would much rather target the desired global image of non-Chinese students as the beneficiaries of their program (Hua and Wei, 2014 p. 329).

Another related criticism is that the Chinese teachers do not seem to know their own culture—the culture the CIs aim to promote internationally—to the degree necessary to teach it (Ibid., p. 334). Because traditional Chinese culture is taught in the CI curriculum, there is a disconnect between the expectations of CI learners and the reality of modern Chinese culture. Teaching modern

Figure 2. Cover of *Confucius Institute* magazine featuring mostly Caucasian subjects (“Volume 34,” 2014).



culture would be impractical because of the variety of subcultures within China (Ibid., p. 333). Therefore, the CIs are instructed to teach a slanted rendition of “traditional” culture as defined by the Beijing leaders who have created the program. Beijing leaders also dictate the use of textbooks and curricula in standard Mandarin Chinese or *Putonghua*, which is the lingua franca of mainland China (Starr 2009, p. 68). Because the teachers have no credentials as instructors of traditional culture, the curriculum is watered down and teaches only superficial Chinese culture. Consequently, the culture the CI program is teaching is neither achieving the modern expectation of what China is, nor establishing a credible source of the traditional Chinese culture that the CIs purport to teach.

Another criticism of the CI program deals with academic freedom and university integrity (Sahlins et al. 2014, p. 27). The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) raised concern about the influence of Beijing’s propaganda in their universities, especially because the CIs are situated on campus and have access to campus resources. For example, the CAUT addresses the censorship or avoidance of controversial topics such as the political situation with regard to Taiwan, the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and the circumstances surrounding Tibet (“China Imposing” 2012). This same censorship within the CI program is also evident in Kenya, where CI students are shown Beijing-endorsed propaganda relating to the situation in Tibet (Wheeler 2014, p. 59). Because Canadian students feel as though they are being misguided with inaccurate and incomplete information, they believe the education provided by the CI does not meet the professed objectives of the program.

In summary, while the CIs may appear to be spreading Chinese language and culture globally, the CI teachers lack pedagogical skills and credentials, the curriculum lacks a credible foundation, the information taught is subject to Beijing control, and foreign-born Chinese students are routinely ignored and passed over. Despite Hanban’s claim that language learning and cultural exchange constitute its first priority, the education offered by the CI program fails to meet this objective.

Resistance to Confucian Institutes

While the unqualified CI teachers and propagandized curricula seriously detract from the CI program, even more deep-seated barriers negatively affect the way the CI program is received in the West. One particular barrier is the perception of communism as a threat to Western democracy, a vestige from the Cold War. Western movements against the CI program, such as CAUT’s action to remove Beijing’s influence from their academic institutions, are in-

dications of the deep-seated antipathy toward communism. Additionally, the incompatibility of Western bottom-up critique versus China's top-down control poses another barrier between China and the West—particularly in the U.S. and Canada. In addition to poorly prepared teachers and questionable educational materials, lingering concerns about ideology and political strategies are relevant in a discussion about the resistance to CIs outside of China.

Because China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the West does not welcome communist notions, the CIs have become an outward display of the Chinese government's attempt to seek legitimacy in the global community outside of political arenas (Starr 2009, p. 65). Moreover, China's approach to moving past governmental differences can be viewed as a "soft power" initiative. Soft power, a term coined by Harvard University political scientist Joseph Nye, refers to getting what you want by using persuasion rather than coercion and force (Hubbert 2014, p. 330). In this case, China uses the CIs to make China appear as a legitimate and magnanimous member of the international community. For example, the soft power CIs are named after Confucius, a great scholar and old master of ancient China. China's association with Confucius suggests that the CCP has claims to a rich, traditional heritage, and the CPP is, or intends to be, as wise and virtuous as Confucius was (Hua and Wei 2014, p. 324; Louie 2011, p. 94). Another example of China's soft power play is the Confucian Classroom (a type of Confucius Institute for secondary schools), with a curriculum lacking any information about politics or government.

Hanban not only attempts to refute the skepticism that originates from the fear of communism but also portrays China and its current state as desirable to the Confucius Classroom/Institute students, manifesting the soft power initiative. The cosmopolitan cities and gorgeous views of the Great Wall of China depicted in textbook images implicitly connect China's economic prosperity and growing economy with Chinese culture and tradition. This is in juxtaposition to the global view that China's success is tied to the exploitation of its large labor force, environmental degradation, and an oppressive communist regime (Hubbert 2014, p. 334). Both the name and content of China's CI program are intended to enhance the legitimacy of the CCP in the eyes of the West.

However, China faces issues when government association creeps into its soft power initiatives, fueling the skepticism regarding the CI program. Despite the efforts to disassociate the CIs from the Chinese government in the minds of their clients, government ties are still evident. Though Hanban controls the CIs and has no declared political association with the Chinese government, the current chair of Hanban, Liu Yandong, has served as one

of twenty-five members on the Chinese Politburo, the committee that supervises the CCP. The troubles Hanban faces with government association are further pronounced because China's "culture and politics are problematically intertwined," a fact that is paradoxically evident when the Chinese government uses culture to "deflect international criticism" (Chu 2014, p. 168). For example, in naming its CI program, China attempts to whitewash human rights violations and environmental degradation by using the name of the wise master of ancient China. Another example relates to the absence of politics in the Confucian Classroom curriculum. Associate Professor Jennifer Hubbert from Lewis and Clark College stated that the soft power initiative causes many parents to interpret "political absence as authoritarian presence, thus reinforcing perceptions of a repressive Chinese governmental apparatus" (2014, p. 336). Despite Hanban's efforts to remove China's political influence from the CI curriculum, the apparent absence of the government ironically becomes a source of skepticism and, ultimately, another blemish on China's professed intentions for global outreach.

Much of the suspicion toward CIs derives from a strong belief in academic freedom. The 120-university strong CAUT is a major force in the movement against CIs (Sahlins et al. 2014, p. 27). CAUT has declared that having a CI on campus damages institutional integrity, and colleges should therefore resist the tempting offer from Hanban (Ibid.). One of the main concerns is that unlike German Goethe Institutes and French Alliance Francaise, CIs are located on campus with access to other campus facilities as well as students (Wheeler 2014, p. 54). In other words, CIs are not stand-alone institutions; rather, the CI classroom is essentially a classroom inside the school (Hubbert 2014, p. 331). What builds on this concern is that the CCP has its hand in the CIs, and, by extension, into higher education in the West (Chu 2014, p. 162). Because China is seen as one of the world's largest offenders in censorship and distorting globally accepted facts, Chinese influence into schools of other countries through its CI program becomes an issue of informational integrity and instruction.

A few examples of such distortions in the Hanban curriculum include statements that Tibet is part of China (Hubbert 2014, p. 335), textbook maps showing Taiwan as part of China (Hubbert 2014, p. 335), and declarations that the Tiananmen Square massacre never happened (Sahlins et al. 2014, p. 27). As an example of Chinese censorship, some CIs have attempted to block guest speakers, including a proposed visit to North Carolina State University in 2009 by the Dalai Lama, the religious leader of a Buddhist sect in Tibet who was exiled by the Chinese government. (Chu 2014, p. 162). Thus, the ability of the CI program to maintain a curriculum that meets Beijing's ex-

ceptions is problematic, especially in the West. Institutions of higher learning in the U.S. and Canada seek academic independence and integrity, even resisting interference from their own governments; to be acted upon by a foreign *communist* government would be exponentially worse. Thus, the CI program's perceived threat to academic integrity continues to plague the reception of CIs in the West.

Another major obstacle to CI reception is based on differing methods of criticism. For hundreds of years, the typical Chinese strategy for making judgments has been significantly different from that of the West. China has traditionally built social relationships on Confucian principles, and although modern-day Confucianism is much different than it was twenty-five hundred years ago (Louie 2011, p. 97), it still greatly influences modern China in at least two significant ways: the meta-rule of obedience and language-emphasizing titles such as "master" (Chu 2014, p. 168). This influence has helped create a Chinese society wherein unquestioned obedience to leaders is mandatory and referring to others based on relative status is a social norm. Hence, in Chinese culture a person is out of place to critique someone of greater authority. In other words, the Chinese demonstrate a top-down strategy in which rulers tell the people what they are doing wrong and those subject to criticism are required to change.

In contrast, Western society has perpetuated a bottom-up strategy in which people question anything and everything, especially leaders. While criticizing the government in China can mean jail time or even death, Western democratic societies criticize and vote for their leaders and pass laws through ballot initiatives and referenda. Because these two approaches to governance are diametric opposites, the resulting conflict between the two systems hinders cross-culture reception, especially when ideas of Chinese culture appear to be tagged with traces of the CCP and vice versa. The Chinese government makes increasing efforts to keep the Western world away from the Chinese people, fearing that the Western media will introduce ideas filled with "spiritual pollution" and "hostile forces" having degrading intents such as "Westernizing" and even dividing China, as spoken by former CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (Chu 2014, p. 164). The Western strategy is just as antagonistic toward the CCP. The conflicting methods of making judgments and enacting change, therefore, provide yet another barrier to the reception of CIs in the West.

Conclusion

As the demand for learning about Chinese language and culture has increased, Hanban has made efforts to satiate this demand with its CI program.

However, because of ineffective teachers and curricula, and the inability to overcome some fundamental differences between Western and Chinese styles of communication and policy making, the CIs are failing to achieve Hanban's stated purposes. At the same time, the West has been wary of the CIs for reasons that include concerns over China's efforts to extend its soft power and exercise control in the arena of academic freedom. Some Western institutions have even expelled CIs from their campuses, as if China's expensive gift were in reality a Trojan horse. Ultimately, there are three reasons why the CIs are problematic in the West. The most obvious is the concern that education offered to the inquisitive CI student falls short of the promised objective; more subtle is the suspicion that China's motives for spending huge amounts of money on its CIs are less than magnanimous; and most troubling is the perception that CIs are playing a role in extending China's soft power. In the final analysis, while the CI program may not pose a Trojan horse threat, it is, nevertheless, a horse with teeth in need of careful examination.

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The Permanence of the Shanghai Communiqué

by David Whitesell

Since 1949, the U.S. has had to face a major issue when interacting with China. This issue lies in the contest between the People's Republic of China (PRC) based in mainland China and the Republic of China (ROC) based on the island of Taiwan for recognition as the legitimate government of China. Since 1979, U.S. policy has been to recognize formally the PRC as the official government of China. This recognition, which ended years of *froideur* between Beijing and Washington, was possible because of the previous decade of rapprochement, which was marked by the episode of "ping-pong diplomacy" in 1971, Nixon's 1972 visit to China, and the Shanghai Communiqué, which established the foreign policy positions of each country (Macmillan 2007, p. xx). The Shanghai Communiqué is the foundation upon which modern-day Sino-U.S. relations are built and delineates areas where the U.S. and China could move forward in a mutually beneficial relationship.

History

Prior to World War II, the U.S. sided with China against Russian and Japanese imperialist aims, ultimately supporting and recognizing the Nationalist Party of China as the legitimate government of China. While the Communist Party of China defeated the nationalists in 1949 and forced them to flee to the island of Taiwan, the U.S. continued to recognize the nationalists as the legitimate government. This led to a period during the 1950s and 1960s of mistrustful relations with the Communist Party in mainland China (Macmillan 2007, p. xix). Near the end of that period, however, as the U.S.

prepared to leave the Vietnam War, there were signs that the cold U.S.–Chinese relations could thaw.

As the citizens of the U.S. grew weary of their involvement in the Vietnam War, President Nixon searched for a way to extricate the U.S. from the war without losing face internationally (Macmillan 2007, p. 119). Chairman Mao saw that as an indicator the U.S. had no more imperialist interests in East Asia and was willing to take steps to bring China closer to the United States. Thus in 1971, when the U.S. ping-pong team was in Japan for a tournament, Mao invited the team to come to China as special guests. That show of openness was enough to signal to the U.S. that China was, to some degree, willing to open its borders. President Nixon responded during the ping-pong team's trip to China by changing the trade policy to allow American trade with China on a level similar to that of the Soviet Union ("The Ping Heard Round the World" 1971). This apparent thawing of relations and low-level trade opened up diplomatic possibilities in the U.S.–Soviet confrontation and economic possibilities.

Nixon showed he wanted to open relations with China when he stated, "There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation" (Nixon 1967, p. 121). He desired to open up to China, change its political orientation, and make it an ally. Encouraged by the episode of ping-pong diplomacy, President Nixon began to communicate with China through various embassies and contacts, which eventually opened the door for him to secretly send Henry Kissinger to negotiate relations with the mainland Chinese (Macmillan 2007, p. 169). The ensuing discussions led to Nixon visiting China in February 1972 and the negotiation of the Shanghai Communiqué.

Shanghai Communiqué

At first glance, the Shanghai Communiqué is a vague document that does not seem to resolve any of the underlying issues behind the bad relations between China and the United States. It mentions that there was "earnest, frank discussion" between the representatives of each country and states each side's views on international relations (White House 1972). There are indications in the final paragraphs that each country wants to work toward a continued relationship, but the declaration is lacking in specifics and commitments from either side. While the lack of specificity is frustrating in that it does not hold either side to a particular stance besides general principles of fairness and respect, the formality and lack of commitment makes sense in the historical context.

After a twenty year *froideur*, one could not expect there to be immediate friendship and loyalty, especially when the Chinese public was accustomed to waves of anti-American propaganda and the Americans were afraid of “Red China” (Macmillan 2007, p. 106). Additionally, neither side wanted to lose face or be seen as making unfair concessions to the other side (Kennedy, Tucker, and Lord 1998, p. 205). With these constraints, it makes sense that instead of a document setting forth working parameters of cooperation on economic and political issues, the Shanghai Communiqué became a statement of interests making each country aware of how the other country saw such issues as the Vietnam War, Taiwan, and global hegemony.

The first five sections of the Shanghai Communiqué simply lay out the nature of the document, giving dates, leaders involved in the negotiation process, and a basic overview of President Nixon’s travels while in China. The communiqué presents the U.S. and China as countries who are declaring their views on the state of international affairs with the intention of building a relationship. It is neutrally worded and fairly straightforward, yet it manages to convey the importance of the issues that were discussed regarding Sino–U.S. relations.

Beginning with the sixth section, the communiqué presents the core purpose of the meeting: providing a foundation of shared beliefs upon which China and the U.S. could build a relationship. Even with the social and political restrictions on making firm statements, the communiqué established several key points relating to China and the United States. Each country took a paragraph to present its core beliefs and interests. The U.S. side focuses on peace and self-determination for countries in the region, reflecting the U.S. desire to leave the Vietnam War, but stresses democracy in the East Asian sphere. Meanwhile, the Chinese side focuses on resisting oppression and encouraging countries to choose their own political systems (White House 1972).

Both countries agreed that the development of a hegemonic power in East Asia was unacceptable. This agreement implicitly referred to the Soviet Union, which both the U.S. and China would work together from there to balance against (Garver 2016, p. 303). Winston Lord, assistant to Henry Kissinger, said in an interview that working with the Chinese against the Soviet Union was one of Nixon’s priorities. In the middle of the Cold War, with fear of communists and the Soviet Union abounding in the U.S. and clashes between the Chinese and the USSR along the Ussuri River in 1969 intensified China’s distrust of the Soviets, working together against Moscow was a practical idea for both parties (Kennedy, Tucker, and Lord 1998, p. 164). Thus the communiqué was a tool to come closer to the Chinese in

confronting the Soviets, thereby putting pressure on the Soviet Union to work with the United States. Indeed, the revelation that the U.S. had been communicating with the Chinese to the extent that the U.S. president visited China caused the USSR to move quickly in setting up a summit meeting with the U.S. and progress on important measures such as the SALT-1 agreement (Kennedy, Tucker, and Lord 1998, p. 198). While the Soviet Union is never mentioned directly in the communiqué, due to the suspicion that both countries had, it loomed in the background of the treaty.

Both China and the United States emphasized the importance of self-determination in East Asian countries, implying that the other country should not intervene. Even though they were on opposite sides of the Vietnam conflict, Nixon and Mao were interested in a longer-term relationship that would outlast the war. The U.S. hoped that meeting with the Chinese would put pressure on the North Vietnamese to negotiate, knowing that its largest ally was considering working together with its wartime opponent. North Vietnam was under communist rule, so concluding the war in Vietnam was a test of Nixon's anti-communist credentials and a balancing act for the U.S. as a democratic nation espousing both peace and democracy. Nixon's willingness to put China ahead of U.S. anti-communist ambitions in the East Asian sphere was a big step in bringing forward Sino-U.S. relations. Additionally, it established that the U.S. would be willing to work with a communist country to promote regional stability and further its own interests, similar to what it had been doing in South America but on a larger scale involving a country its own size.

Taiwan

The Shanghai Communiqué was also the first step the U.S. took toward normalizing Sino-U.S. relations. Previously, the U.S. formally had recognized the Republic of China, based in Taiwan, as the legitimate government of China, but Nixon's visit to China changed public perception and resulted in an official statement regarding Taiwan-China relations. While the Chinese kept to their traditional position in the communiqué, declaring forcefully that Taiwan is part of China and nobody should interfere in Chinese internal affairs, the U.S. conceded some ground to mainland Chinese by not challenging their position, with its implied pro-communist leanings, although it did leave the ambiguity of simply "acknowledging" the Chinese position (White House 1972).

U.S.-Taiwan relations played a significant role in how well the U.S. could negotiate with China. The U.S. had a thirty-year history of siding with the Republic of China. The Shanghai Communiqué worried the Taiwan-

ese, who feared the U.S. would turn its support entirely to the Communist Party in mainland China. Though the U.S. reassured them that was not its intention, it began the process of normalizing U.S. relations with mainland China. In a conversation with Zhou Enlai, Henry Kissinger stated, “We are not advocating a two-China solution or a one China, one Taiwan solution” (White House 1971). Declaring in the Shanghai Communiqué that the U.S. intended to reduce and eventually remove its military forces from Taiwan was a sign to Taiwan that it could not expect the same level of support it had received in the past from the United States.

Seven years later, in 1986, the U.S. and China produced the *Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations*, which established diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC, dissolving official U.S. diplomatic connections with the ROC in Taiwan. The new communiqué did, however, allow the U.S. to maintain cultural and commercial connections with the people of Taiwan, which began the unofficial U.S. position of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan (White House 1979). To avoid provoking China and jeopardizing trade, the U.S. does not officially protect Taiwan or support any Taiwanese independence movements. However, the U.S. continues to maintain close cultural ties with Taiwan. In fact, the U.S., upon ratifying the 1986 communiqué, also enacted the *Taiwan Relations Act*, which stated the U.S. would maintain economic and cultural ties with the governing authorities of the territory formerly recognized as the ROC (U.S. House of Representatives 1979).

Arms sales to Taiwan has historically been an obstacle in Sino–U.S. relations. In 2017, the U.S. sold \$1.42 billion in military technology to Taiwan (Brunnstrom and Mohammed 2017). In 2015, the U.S. sold \$1.83 billion in arms to Taiwan (Forsythe 2015). These sales have been going on since the 1980s, in spite of protest from the PRC. While the U.S. position on Taiwan outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué acknowledges that mainland China considered Taiwan to be part of China, it also focused on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan situation (White House 1972). In a later communiqué in 1982, the U.S. and China reaffirmed their previous statements regarding Taiwan, and the U.S. said that it would reduce arms sales to Taiwan, but made no final decisions made about the fate of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan (White House 1982).

While the U.S. officially maintains the principles it declared in the Shanghai Communiqué, it also adheres to the unofficial principle of strategic ambiguity by not letting the PRC know how far it will go to protect Taiwan’s independence. To add to the confusion, following the ratification of the 17 August 1982 communiqué, Assistant Secretary of State John Hold-

ridge gave a speech in which the U.S. unilaterally added six points related to the communiqué. These points clarified that the U.S. would not be bound to certain limitations regarding Taiwan, including a date for ending the arms sales, discussing its Taiwan policy with the PRC, or pressuring Taiwan to negotiate with mainland China. Those claims gave the U.S. much more room to maneuver within the context of the Taiwan Relations Act and the 17 August communiqué. Those six assurances were later formalized in 2016 in a congressional resolution “Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States–Taiwan relations” (U.S. Senate 2016). The ambiguity present today in the U.S.–China–Taiwan relationship, which allows the U.S. to continue a relationship with Taiwan outside of Chinese approval, stems from the original wording in the Shanghai Communiqué.

Areas of Agreement

The Shanghai Communiqué contains much more text detailing areas where the Chinese and the Americans have differing viewpoints on issues than detailing areas where their viewpoints align, but after the initial declaration of views and positions, the two countries list several points of mutual agreement upon which they could construct a relationship. Both nations agreed that countries “should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states . . . equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (White House 1972). While maintaining a broad perspective by including all states in their agreement, the communiqué was intended to establish such ideals in the agreements between China and the United States. Though the Shanghai Communiqué was expanded upon seven years later in the 1979 *Joint Communiqué*, the original treaty principles still applied and the U.S. extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC with the assumption that such an action would produce mutually beneficial terms, particularly regarding trade and peaceful coexistence, especially with the Soviet Union’s looming presence. Indeed, the text of the *Joint Communiqué* continues to promote the ideals of peace between the U.S. and the PRC, as stated: “Both believe that the normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world” (White House 1979). That ideal was achieved in 1979 with the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.

After the Communiqué

For a policy created almost fifty years ago, it is perhaps surprising that the tenets espoused in the Shanghai Communiqué have remained unchanged. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in his book *On China*, “Nor-

mally, communiqués have a short shelf life. They define a mood rather than a direction” (Kissinger 2011, p. 267). On the part of the U.S., the original sentiments remain, such as a desire to avoid hegemony and peacefully to resolve issues in Asia, particularly regarding cross-strait relations. Similarly, the Chinese position that regions should determine their own political systems and the recognition that China and the U.S. have different social systems remain (White House 1972). Kissinger commented that in the forty years the Shanghai Communiqué had been around, the leaders of the respective countries had continued the relationship “in an astonishingly consistent manner” (Kissinger 2011, p. xvi).

In part, this was due to the narrow margin of error inherent in the communiqué. After twenty years of hostility, neither side was willing to concede much to make any kind of official position, because both leaders were worried about losing face. In fact, Mao rejected the initial proposal for a draft, refusing to abandon his communist ideals for any kind of compromise with the Americans (Kissinger 2011, p. 269). Each leader’s desire to stand firm resulted in the strange dual nature of the communiqué, a document that, instead of formalizing a compromise between two nations, details the opposing positions of each country. That format is what kept the document relevant for the seven years until normalization with the PRC and for thirty-eight years after. Each side could refer to the document and rest assured its beliefs had been made clear, and further negotiations could simply refer back to the Shanghai Communiqué.

Furthermore, there were only a handful of people involved in the negotiations on the American side. Nixon made most of the preparations for his trip in secret, with only a handful of close advisors aware of his plans. Foremost among these advisors was Henry Kissinger, but other secretaries and assistants like Winston Lord and Anthony Lake went on to become secretaries of state and national security advisors. Those individuals who rose to prominent government positions after the Nixon and Kissinger era continued the same style of secret, strategically ambiguous negotiations during the Carter and Reagan eras (Mann 1999, p. 79). The new generation of leaders still held the assumption that the Shanghai Communiqué ought to be the foundation of Sino–U.S. dealings and China be given special considerations because of its strategic importance. Later administrations continued to attach the same importance to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, assuming a Cold War policy based on thwarting the Soviet Union and seeing the communiqué as a document which had served the U.S. well over a the past quarter century (Ibid., p. 216). That acceptance of the status quo even through events like the Tiananmen Square massacre and the fall of

the Soviet Union cemented the Shanghai Communiqué as the foundation of Sino–U.S. policy.

Conclusion

Due to the bold step President Nixon took in visiting China, the U.S. was pulled into a largely unanticipated relationship with China. Given their Cold War-style relations and the prevailing anti-Communist views in America, it was impossible to entirely bridge the rift that existed between the two nations. However, as a result of Nixon’s visit to China and the preparations that went into it, the U.S. and the PRC approved the Shanghai Communiqué, the document that has served as the official U.S. position on China for the past forty-five years. From its inception, the document was ambiguous, and it contained veiled references to the international conflicts of the time. Due to the strategic ambiguity inherent in the document, it was relevant through several administrations and served the U.S. through normalization with the PRC and to the modern day. Though its architects Nixon and Kissinger left office, the politicians who followed them shared their views on Chinese–U.S. relations and let the document be. As a result, the Shanghai Communiqué, an agreement from 1972, is still used as a basis for U.S. foreign relations today.

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