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Submission Guidelines

The Rice Papers welcomes academic submissions that engage Asia on virtually any topic. Send submissions, comments, or other inquiries to ricepapersbyu1@gmail.com.

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Preface

This is the sixth volume of *The Rice Papers*, an undergraduate academic journal of Asian Studies at Brigham Young University, and the first edition published since 2018. This current volume of *The Rice Papers* represents many hours of time volunteered by the most dedicated group of people. After a three-year hiatus, our new staff is pleased to present you with the newest volume of our beloved journal, and we humbly acknowledge all of those who have kept the journal alive in the last few years.

We are most pleased to present you with these four essays that demonstrate some of the passion for Asia within the BYU undergraduate student body. We start out in during the warring states period of China as we explore how human nature was discussed by philosophers during that time. We then jump forward to the twentieth century and learn about how the differences in how communism was perceived in China and Russia led to the eventual Sino-Soviet split after WWII. Our next selection is a literature review that discusses the events in South East Asia, specifically Cambodia and Vietnam, and the countries' struggle between democracy and communism, relationships with China, and relationships with each other. We then sign off this volume with a profound discussion on the history and rise of feminism in South Korea and how the women in South Korea have struggled to raise a voice against sexual assault in a society where their voices are often ignored.

We extend our sincerest gratitude to Dr. Eric Hyer who has been the biggest supporter and campaigner for us in publishing this journal. We also give our deepest thanks to the David M. Kennedy Center for funding this journal and the Kennedy Center Communications staff for their invaluable contributions and help in getting this volume into physical form. We also thank the professors and fellow students who supported us and to all of those who submitted and have shown support along our way. It is our hope that *The Rice Papers* will continue to be a platform for undergraduate students interested in Asian studies to continue to publish their work.

—*The Rice Papers* staff

About the Authors

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Paulee Fogleman is a history major at Brigham Young University. Winter semester 2021 is her last semester as an undergraduate and she hopes to continue her time as a student in law school. She is from Connecticut and enjoys comedy, writing, painting, and music. This is her first official publication regarding Chinese history, and she is writing other works about Chinese and Southeast Asian history.

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Braeden Davis is a senior majoring in political science and minoring in European studies. He will be starting a PhD program this fall at the University of California Davis studying political science. He hopes to become a professor someday. Braeden likes reading, writing, baking with his wife, and listening to the Beatles.

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Nhi Phan is a senior who majors in Asian Studies at BYU. Originally from Vietnam, Nhi is interested in researching topics related to Vietnamese and Southeast Asian history. These topics include the Sino-Vietnamese relations since 1975, life of the people along the Vietnam-China borderlands, and the Vietnamese diaspora in North America. In September 2021, Nhi will begin her studies at the University of Toronto in Canada, where she will pursue her Master's in History. Nhi wishes to continue researching and learning more about the topics of Vietnamese history in graduate school.

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Midori Raymond is a senior majoring in linguistics at BYU. She was first introduced to Korean culture in early 2019 in a Korean culture and a premodern Korean history class. In this class, she developed an interest in studying women in premodern and modern Korea. This introduction to Korea also led her to enjoy learning the Korean language and to develop an affinity for its phonology. After graduating from BYU, Midori plans to take a year off before heading back to school.

Warfare: The Test of Human Nature
A look at Chinese philosophy of human nature during the Warring States Period

Paulee Fogleman

Acommon theme many Chinese philosophers explore and debate is the state of human nature and how one can best follow the Way. Bryan W. Van Norden, a scholar of Chinese philosophy, explains that the early Chinese thinkers were looking for the *Dao*, or the "right way to live one's life and organize society," also known as the "ultimate metaphysical entity that was responsible for the way the world is and the way that it ought to be."[1] As the philosophers of the "Hundred Schools of Thought" sought to explain the chaotic time that was the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), warfare and its role in everyday life became a topic of much debate as it pertained to the natural goodness or badness of human nature. Was human nature inclined to war out of greed and an inherent evilness, or does war occur out of the innermost desire to protect what is good and virtuous?

As the Warring States period progressed, Ancient China became filled with military developments such as mass infantries, absolute monarchs, and territorial states. Warfare became a constant interaction between different peoples, and it only ended in 221 BCE when the Qin state, the most brutal and effective in their execution of warfare, conquered the other states to form the first empire of China. Each philosopher that came on the ideological scene of the chaotic time conversed with the others through their writings and teachings as warfare increased. Mark Edward Lewis, in his book entitled *Sanctioned Violence in Early China*, describes how early rulers and thinkers "first explained the physical world in terms of their own self-understanding and then 'discovered' that their practices and institutions exactly mirrored or expressed the natural order of things," which

was particularly important in the "tracing of the origins of human violence back into the elementary 'stuff' that underlay all physical existence."[2] Using the universe and the Way to justify and sanctify certain types of violence was a tradition that ran deep in the Chinese people, and its prevalence in Chinese thought and political theory continued to permeate the philosophical thoughts and teachings of thinkers and rulers alike.

Kongzi, more commonly known as Confucius, greatly stressed the importance of cultivating one's virtues, teaching that being good does take conscious choice, but one can make it his natural state of being through continuous work and adherence to ritual.[3] Laozi in the *Dao de jing* teaches that people must yield to the natural *Dao*, or Way of the world, implying that the natural ways of mankind—their human nature—is good when untouched by contrived action or "cultivation."[4] There was also the opposite extreme where Xunzi argued that "human nature is bad . . . [because it] is such that people are born with a love of profit,"[5] and therefore, as his student Han Feizi argued, "the enlightened ruler, in ruling his country . . . depends on laws and prohibitions to control the people, not on their sense of decency."[6] Despite the clear differences in beliefs of what human nature was and could be, many still believed war to be either necessary or inescapable, especially because war was such a constant throughout their lives. Mark Edward Lewis discovered in his research that violence is sanctioned in human society with specific conditions that make it acceptable. This "sanctioned" violence was especially applicable to the Warring States period and its thinkers:

> Through knowing what forms of violence were permitted, who could perform them, how these actions were rationalized, and how violence figured in tales and metaphors, one learns about the locus and exercise of authority in a given society, its basic social groupings, to what matters it attributed highest significance, and the manner in which it defined its own civilization and its relation to the natural world.[7]

When human nature was seen as good, or at least subject to growth with cultivation, war was seen as a contrived action, a sanctioned last resort if necessary, for protecting virtue and morality. However, for those who believed that human nature was inherently bad, war was seen as necessary not only to maintaining rule but also to providing a purpose that men could dedicate their lives to.

Kongzi openly departed from using military solutions for society's problems and advocated the institution of "benevolent, wise, and reverent" gentlemen into the government, which made his teachings initially unpopular in the tense Warring States period. Kongzi believed that benevolent gentlemen would be able to rule skillfully, and the force of war would not

be necessary.[8] The following lesson is recorded in the *Analects* regarding this perspective of government:

> Zigong inquired about governing. The Master [Confucius] said, "Make food supplies sufficient, provide an adequate army, and give the people reason to have faith." Zigong asked, "If one had no choice but to dispense with one of these three, which should it be?" [The Master said,] "Eliminate the army." Zigong continued, "If one had no choice but to get rid of one of the two remaining, which should it be?" "Dispense with the food," Confucius said. "Since ancient times, death has always occurred, but people without faith cannot stand."[9]

In this sense, virtue is an essential aspect of human nature, and people should actively cultivate that virtue to become gentlemen. This does not necessarily mean that human nature is bad, but rather primitive and undeveloped. Confucius taught:

> Raise up the upright; put them over the crooked: the people will submit. Raise up the crooked [and] put them over the upright: the people will not submit. [10]

Rulers who have not yet become gentlemen in their hearts see warfare instead of benevolence as a sign of a good government. This is illustrated in the *Analects*, when Kongzi reportedly said, "One who governs through virtue may be compared to the polestar, which occupies its place while the host of other stars pay homage to it," showing that when a ruler is a cultivated gentleman, his moral force and humaneness cause others to be drawn to him without the need of physical force.[11] However, the idealized Confucian ideas of government still allow some caveats for warfare. The *Analects* also taught:

> In ruling a state of a thousand chariots, one is reverent in the handling of affairs and shows himself to be trustworthy. One is economical in expenditures, loves the people, and uses them only at the proper season.[12]

According to this philosophical view, as moral gentlemen rule, there will be no need for war because others will flock to what is right. However, warfare is not necessarily completely out of the question. It is through righteous exercising of political theory that allows a ruler to act and protect his people.

Philosophical Daoism had a different approach to warfare and its relationship to human nature from Confucianism; Laozi taught that nonaction, or achieving through yielding, is the only way to properly follow the Way, or Dao, of the world. According to the text, the greatest success for a state comes from yielding to a conquering state and having its values shine through; it is better to lose in war but have ideologies and traditions carry

on, than it is to win a war outright. In Chapter 61 of the *Dao de jing*, this concept is explained in a paradoxical manner:

> A large state is the effluence of a river,
> Confluence of the world,
> Female of the world,
> Through stillness the female always overcomes the male.
> Through stillness she submits.
> Thus, by submitting, a large state wins a small one,
> And a small state, by submitting to a large state,
> wins the large state.
> Thus one submits in order to win,
> The other submits in order to be won.
> The large state only wants to nourish the people as a whole.
> The small state only wants to enter the service of others.
> Each getting what it wants, it is right to submit.[13]

Philosophical Daoism saw nonaction as the best course of action to truly comply with the Way and argued that it was the contrived actions of leaders that brought chaos and disorder. When rulers tried to force their states to go to war, their states would fall. However, if a state was guided to take over another state and both were simply submitting to the natural course of actions, then that was seen as the Way.

Han Feizi, a student of the Confucian Xunzi, agreed with his master on the idea that human nature is inherently bad, but took the argument to its logical extension: if human nature is bad, then it must be governed by beneficial rewards and inescapable punishments. Rather than focusing on the old traditional Confucian ideas of self-cultivation to combat natural inclinations toward evil, Han Feizi drew on Daoist and Legalist ideas in his writing. He explained the Way of the Ruler through mysticism, endorsed rational uses of power, and created strict legal codes to enforce the rule of the state.[14] Han Feizi argued:

> When the sage rules, he takes into consideration the quantity of things and deliberates on scarcity and plenty. Though his punishments may be light, this is not due to his compassion; though his penalties may be severe, this is not because he is cruel; he simply follows the custom appropriate to the time . . . Humaneness may make one shed tears and be reluctant to apply penalties, but law makes it clear that such penalties must be applied. The ancient kings allowed law to be supreme and did not give in to their tearful longings. Hence it is obvious that humaneness cannot be used to achieve order in the state . . . [15]

This philosophy accompanied the rise of the Qin state, which successfully employed it to conquer and unite all the states of China and bring an end

to the Warring States period. Han Feizi was so pessimistic regarding the goodness of human nature that he said, "Hardly ten men of true integrity and good faith can be found today, and yet the offices of the state number in the hundreds."[16] Han Feizi elaborated:

> If the virtuous are placed in prominent positions, transgressions will remain hidden; but if the wicked are employed, crimes will be punished. In the former case the people will be stronger than the law; in the latter, the law will be stronger than the people . . . In the application of punishments, light offenses should be regarded as serous; if light offenses do not occur, serious ones have no chance of coming. This is said to be "ruling the people while in a state of law and order."[17]

Though this philosophy was essential to the power the Qin empire had had with its first emperor, the same philosophy brought the downfall of the empire and increased warfare as chaos had a chance to reign; it became clear that "the government was paralyzed by the force of its own autocratic laws."[18] It was not that Legalism asserted that warfare was itself bad; on the contrary, warfare was an important way to show the strength of the centralized state and show the effectiveness of suppressing human nature's self-interested tendencies. However, as the government collapsed, the question had to be asked: was Legalism *really* correcting the problems of human nature, or was it creating an environment of suppression where human nature became desperate and evil and a place where warfare became necessary? While the idealized view of Confucianism did not make enough room for the reality of war, Legalist thinkers did not place enough faith in the fact that good people do exist and will fight for what is right.

According to the sum of the philosophers' arguments, it seems clear that warfare, and the desire for the chaos it brings, can be very natural to human nature. However, while looking through the many different perspectives of the Chinese philosophers, I am compelled by the argument Mencius made that regards human nature as good, inherently and potentially. While still a Confucian thinker, he asserts, in a way that Confucius never did, that human nature itself is good; cultivation just maintains the goodness that was already there instead of creating something new. Mencius refers us to the thought experiment of the child on the well:

> The reason why I say that humans all have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others is this. Suppose someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well: everyone in such a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion—not because one sought to get in good with the child's parents, not because one wanted fame among their neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child's

cries. From this we can see that if one is without the heart of compassion, one is not a human.[19]

There is a part of us, despite our anger, bloodthirst, and desire for power, that deeply cares for the safety and happiness of others as well as ourselves. Therefore, according to the myriad of Chinese perspectives on human nature, it can be concluded that warfare is inevitable not only when people choose to act against the Way of goodness in human nature, but also when people refuse to make the contrived actions of continuing to cultivate goodness. War can also be a good, sanctioned action that protects what is right about human civilization and nature. Mencius also taught:

> It is true that water does not distinguish between east and west, but does it fail to distinguish between up and down? The goodness of human nature is like the downward course of water. There is no human being lacking in the tendency to do good, just as there is no water lacking in the tendency to flow downward. Now by striking water and splashing it, you may cause it to go over your head, and by damming and channeling it, you can force it to flow uphill. But is this the nature of water? It is the force that makes this happen. While people can be made to do what is not good, what happens to their nature is like this.[20]

War is a natural endpoint to a nature that refuses to choose goodness over greed, yet it is also contrived action by the righteous to protect what is virtuous and good. Somehow, warfare can be good and bad because human nature itself fluctuates based on what one chooses to act on. Humans can still choose to make bad choices, but that does not mean that humanity is hopeless.

Notes

1. Van Norden, Bryan W. *Introduction of Classical Chinese Philosophy*. Indianapolis/Cambridge, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2011, page 11. Italics removed.

2. Lewis, Mark Edward. *Sanctioned Violence in Early China.* (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1990), page 213.q1

3. *Sources of Chinese Tradition. Volume I: from Earliest Time to 1600.* 2nd ed. Vol. 1. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999, page 46. The teaching alluded to comes from the *Analects* 2:3, which says "Lead them by means of regulations and keep order among them through punishments, and the people will evade them and will lack any sense of shame. Lead them through moral force (*de*) and keep order among them through rites (*li*), and they will have a sense of shame and will also correct themselves." Abbreviated as "SCT" from this point on.

4. SCT, page 90–91. The *Dao de jing* says "Therefore the sage says: / I do nothing (*wuwei*), / And the people are transformed by themselves. / I value tranquility, / And the people become correct by themselves. / I take no actions (*wushi*), / And the people become prosperous by themselves. / I have no desires, / And the people of themselves become like uncarved wood." Passages like this that highlight non-contrived action and little interference of government in the lives of average people show that nature will guide people to goodness themselves, thereby implying that human nature itself is good when it is untouched as much as possible by cultivation.

5. Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2nd Ed.* (New York: Free Press, 1993), page 25.

6. Ebrey, *Sourcebook,* page 36.

7. Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence*, page 5.

8. Van Norden, *Classical Chinese Philosophy*, page 19.

9. Ebrey, *Sourcebook* page 21.

10. SCT, page 47, 2:19.

11. SCT, page 46, 2:1.

12. SCT, page 45, 1:5.

13. SCT, page 91.

14. SCT, page 199.

15. SCT, page 200.

16. SCT, page 202.

17. SCT, page 196.

18. SCT, page 207.

19. Van Norden, *Chinese Classical Philosophy*, page 88; the citation included in the book for the primary source quote is *Mengzi* 2A:6.

20. SCT, page 200.

The Effect of Nationalistic Communism on the Sino-Soviet Split

Braeden Davis

In the early 1950s, the world communist movement seemed unstoppable. Without giving the liberal democracies time to catch their breath following World War II, the world's socialist nations confronted the West in a dangerous Cold War standoff. In less than a decade, communist parties had consolidated power across most of the Eurasian continent, all under the powerful protection of the Soviet Union and its communist party (hereafter referred to as the CPSU). Most significantly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had taken control of China, thus establishing the most populous communist nation on earth. The Chinese were close allies of the Soviets, receiving aid in building a socialist economy while at the same time fighting a Soviet-backed war with the Americans for influence on the Korean Peninsula. The international communist movement seemed monolithic, with the revolutionary influence emanating from Moscow and Beijing seemingly ready to cover the globe.

But only a little over a decade later, the world was divided along very different lines. The People's Republic of China (PRC) now ferociously denounced their former ally. China would eventually (in the early 1970s) pivot into a close strategic relationship with the United States in an effort to balance threats from its former Soviet ally. What explains this rapid split between the two most important countries in the world communist movement? There are a host of factors that lead to this Sino-Soviet split. These include system level balance of power arguments, the characteristics of the two countries, and the idiosyncrasies of individual actors. Focusing on the

characteristics of the two states and their ruling parties, this paper explores the major roles that divergent conceptions of nationalism played in the two communist parties' ideologies. This paper demonstrates how these different conceptions (especially on the Chinese end of the relationship) facilitated tensions in a host of policy areas that contributed to the dissolution of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Before diving into the effect of the interaction of nationalism and communism on the Sino-Soviet split, it is important to remember that there are other factors that contributed to the schism. The individual conflict between Mao and Khrushchev stands out as one such factor. Mao saw himself as a great Marxist theoretician, ideologically wrestling with other great Marxist-Leninist thinkers (Starr 40–41). This surely inclined him to distrust and despise Khrushchev, who attempted to unilaterally alter Marxist doctrine without himself having ever authored a work on Marxist-Leninist Theory (Floyd 37). Perhaps further study could be conducted on how the animosity between the two men interacted with Mao's sense of nationalism. But this paper, while mentioning events and statements made by the two men, focuses primarily on how the state- and party-level ideologies influenced the collapse of the great communist alliance. This paper does not claim to be a comprehensive explanation of all of the events and actors that lead to the Sino-Soviet split. Rather, it shows how Chinese communism's sensitivity to national slights impeded Sino-Soviet cooperation in certain areas, ultimately contributing to the schism.

Nationalism and the Development of Communist Ideology in Russia and China

Nationalism, the zealous love and advocacy for one's nation, played very different roles in the embrace and evolution of communist ideology in China and the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, nationalism was initially denounced and only eventually embraced. This created a weaker marriage of nationalism and communism than existed in China. On the other hand, nationalism was a primary motivator for the embrace of communism in China. This difference in outlook had long term effects on communist ideology in each country and sowed the seeds of division between the two branches of the world communist movement.

Like other universalistic systems of thought, communism at least claims to ignore national boundaries and embrace the brotherhood and sisterhood of all humanity. It foresees a utopian future when all class and other distinctions will be removed and all of humanity will live in communist equality. This universalism was generally reflected in communism's adoption in Russia. The first two decades of Bolshevik rule were marked by "internationalism and class-consciousness" (Brandenberger 1). The Bol-

shevik leader Vladimir Lenin claimed that nation states were formed out of the bourgeoisie quest for market domination (Sewel). He further argued that imperialistic wars between people were a direct result of the capitalist system (Lenin). After coming to power in the early twentieth century, the Bolsheviks made the seemingly anti-nationalistic move of conceding to the Germans in World War I.

The Soviets only began to embrace Russian nationalism under Stalin in the 1930s. They did so by using propaganda to tie Russian national heroes and myths to the legitimacy of the Marxist-Leninist regime (Brandenberger 1). This process carried over into World War II, which was framed as the "Great Patriotic War." Despite this later embrace of nationalism, Soviet Communism was rooted in universalistic Marxist-Leninist ideas. This non-nationalistic strain was perhaps reinforced by the Soviets' successful cooperation with Western capitalistic countries during World War II. This history of successful cooperation would reemerge as a wedge between the Russians and Chinese during the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Compared to its development in Russia, communism in China was always tied to a quest for the health and glory of the Chinese nation. After its century of humiliation at the hands of imperialist colonizers, China was desperate for salvation, for an ideology that could help it regain its sovereignty and glory. Many early communist leaders saw Communism as a way to restore China to its status as a great nation (Garver 5–6). Marxist revolution even took a back seat to national preservation while the CCP formed a united front with the Chinese Nationalists to liberate China from Japanese domination during the 1930s and 40s. Contrast this with the Bolsheviks' decision to withdraw from World War I to conclude their own revolution.

Chinese communism's marriage to nationalism is perhaps best exemplified by Mao's iconic (and likely apocryphal) declaration that "the Chinese people have stood up" (SCMP Reporter). Note how this slogan calls attention to the Chinese people and not to the international proletariat. This boded ill for China ever being a submissive member of the global proletariat, humbly obeying the Soviet Union's vanguard party (Lo 25). Marxism was meant to liberate China from domination by foreign powers, even Marxist foreign powers.

The Effects of Nationalist Marxism on the Two Countries' Cooperation

Despite initially facilitating cooperation between the Soviet Union and the PRC, the disparate ways in which nationalism was associated with communism and communist regimes in the two countries ultimately contributed to the rupture in the world communist movement. The CCP's drive

for national glory and prosperity encouraged it to imitate and cooperate with the Soviets. But the marriage of Chinese communism to nationalism ultimately lead the CCP to criticize the CPSU's leadership of the world communist movement.

Initial Period of Cooperation and Shift to Tension

The nationalistic-minded Chinese initially saw the Soviet Union as an admirable role model in their quest for national glory. Over thirty years, the Soviets had transformed their country into an industrial and military giant, ultimately culminating in their ability to decisively defeat Nazi Germany (Garver 8). Mao Zedong had high regard for the Soviet economic system. He pored over Stalin's *Short Course* (a moderately accurate account of the process of Soviet industrialization) and saw it as the gospel truth on how to create a socialist industrial society. Mao strove to bring his country into close alignment with the USSR in an effort to imitate its successes. The CCP began to rely heavily on economic and planning assistance from Moscow to transition China from an agrarian capitalist country into an industrialized socialist power. The presence of Russian advisors and heavy flows of capital from the USSR helped tie the two countries close together (Garver 8).

But even in this early period of relative cooperation between the two countries, Soviet actions rubbed the Chinese sense of nationalism the wrong way. During initial Sino-Soviet negotiations in the 1950s, the Soviets insisted that they maintain rights to certain railroads and ports in Manchuria and that the PRC recognize the independence of Mongolia. The Chinese could have chosen to view these requests as attempts by the Soviets to balance capitalist power in the Pacific and uphold a fellow socialist state, but they chose to view them as offenses against the Chinese people. This makes sense, as these demands clearly ran counter to the Chinese communists' ideas about sovereignty and the sanctity of China's old imperial borders. Ultimately, the Chinese accepted them out of a desire to secure a relationship with the Soviets, but this was the beginning of tensions with Moscow rooted in Chinese communism's desire to protect the prestige of the Chinese nation.

China's nationalistic Marxism eventually created the inclination to resist aspects of Soviet leadership and coordination of the world communist movement in general. As the first and most advanced country to adopt Socialism, the Soviets saw themselves as the rightful leaders of the world communist movement (Lo 25). Before the completion of the Sino-Soviet split, the CCP encouraged the CPSU in its role at the head of the world revolutionary forces. But beginning in 1957, the CCP began to demand that the Soviets act more like leaders (Zagoria 146–47). From the Chinese

point of view, of course, to act more like a leader, the CPSU needed to act in accordance with China's view of Marxism-Leninism. This is shown fairly clearly by an outline of one of Mao's speeches. Mao starts by piously claiming that union between the USSR and PRC was inevitable and that there was only "one finger in ten" of a difference between the two countries. But he proceeds by enumerating in great detail the many ways in which the USSR has failed China and its view of Marxism-Leninism (Mao). Some of his critiques of Soviet action were influenced by the nationalistic strain in Chinese communism.

The influence of nationalism in China is particularly clear in their interactions with the Soviets regarding three areas of policy: Eastern Europe, Cold War military coordination, and détente with the West.

Chinese Reactions to Soviet Leadership in Eastern Europe

In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev came to power in the Soviet Union and began a process of de-Stalinization. This included a softening towards the West and constituted a softening of the socialist system. The CCP had many issues with this policy in its own right, but this section focuses on how the Chinese critiqued Soviet handling of the Eastern European reaction to de-Stalinization.

Falsely reading de-Stalinization as an opportunity to disobey Moscow, several Eastern European countries began to soften totalitarian control in varying degrees. Chinese reactions to Soviet interventions in Poland and Hungary reveal how a desire to protect national sovereignty influenced the CCP's views of CPSU leadership. The Chinese objected to intervention in another party's affairs, unless that intervention prevented the complete disappearance of socialist control.

In Poland, resistance to old forms of domination took the form of the release of political prisoners, protests by workers, and the selection of "rightist" Władysław Gomułka as party leader by the Politburo. The Soviets reacted by beginning a military intervention in Poland. This troubled the Chinese, who saw such action as domination of one socialist fraternal state by another and as an example of "big power chauvinism." Mao made it clear to the Soviet ambassador to Beijing that China would support Poland against Moscow if the Soviet Union invaded Poland (Garver 117–19).

Resistance took on a much more revolutionary form in Hungary. Protests there eventually toppled single-party rule by the Communist party and lead to rule by a multi-party coalition. The Hungarians even attempted to move towards the community of free and democratic European states. But the Soviets hesitated and prepared to withdraw military forces from Hungary. Mao strongly denounced this plan because he saw the situation in Hungary as a collapse of the Socialist system as opposed to a simple

internal party affair like the situation in Poland. This demanded that the Soviets intervene in the name of the international proletariat (Garver 119).

Thus, we see that the Chinese were comfortable with the Soviets intervening in the affairs of other socialist nations only if they did so in an effort stop the collapse of a communist regime. When it came to matters of what Beijing saw as internal affairs, the Chinese believed that exercise of power by the Soviets constituted big power chauvinism, something akin to the imperialist domination suffered by China. This distrust of big power domination came at least partially from the close association of CCP ideology with the struggle to create a sovereign and glorious China.

Chinese views of the CPSU's handling of the Eastern European uprisings continued to trouble inter-party relations, ultimately contributing to the Sino-Soviet split. For example, Chinese protests and desires for explanations about these events were pesky enough that in 1960, during negotiations with Chinese diplomats, a Soviet negotiator demanded to know "why [the Chinese] now [wished] to return to the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary" (Deng et al.). China's nationalistic ideology lead China to be critical of certain aspects of Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe, exasperating Sino-Soviet ties.

Chinese Nationalism Objected to Soviet Coordination of Cold War Efforts

The Chinese marriage of nationalism and communism also interfered with Soviet attempts to coordinate the Cold War military actions. This first became clear in the aftermath of the Chinese bombardment of two Chinese Nationalist-held islands between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Without informing the Soviets of their intentions (despite a meeting between Mao and Khrushchev just a few days previously), the CCP initiated their attack against Taiwanese positions. The attack was motivated the by the CCP's nationalistic belief that all of China must be united under one flag (and, of course, their desire for that one flag to be their own). Garver also suggests that the attack was an attempt by Mao to show the Soviets how struggle against US imperialism should be waged (Garver 138). In any case, the attack frightened the Soviets, who feared getting drawn into a war between the United States and China. The Chinese reassured the Soviets that they were willing to conduct any resulting war with the Americans alone. This further troubled the Soviets, who saw Chinese reassurances as an attempt to rework the terms of the Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty. A CPSU communiqué to the Chinese subtly encouraged the CCP to remember that the two parties were "firm and united . . . which flow from Marxism-Leninism, to defend the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all brother Communist Parties is unshakeable" (Garver 142). This letter can

be seen as an attempt by the Soviets to remind the Chinese communists of the solidarity of the world communist movement, and that they should not pursue their own nationalistic interests in the coordinated efforts of the Cold War (Garver 138–142).

Further difficulties in Soviet attempts to coordinate the Cold War came in the early 1960s when the Soviets suggested a joint Sino-Soviet naval base on Hainan island in the South China Sea. Although this would have been of great strategic advantage in the geopolitical struggle with the Americans, the Chinese completely refused the Soviets because they saw their offer as an effort by another imperialist power to usurp China's sovereignty. In this instance, the Soviets demonstrated that they had little sensitivity to the Chinese's desire to maintain national sovereignty over areas they considered to be a part of China. Their conception of Marxism-Leninism saw Cold War conflict as an international struggle against the capitalistic West, but it failed to take into account the strong strain of nationalism inherent in Chinese communism. This, of course, further exasperated tensions between the two powers. Mao included criticism of this Soviet request in his aforementioned critique of the Soviets, referring to the proposal as an attack that the Chinese had "resisted" (Mao).

The Impact of Chinese Nationalism on the Debate Regarding Soviet Detente with the West

This resistance to Soviet leadership also became apparent as the Soviets began to transition back to their internationalist method of negotiation with the West following Stalin's death (this transition can be seen as ideologically possible because of the Soviets' history of cooperation with the West developed during World War II). Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union began to seek ways to defuse tensions with the West through diplomacy, eventually meeting with US President Eisenhower in 1959 (Zagoria 240–41). This thawing of Cold War tensions was greatly disturbing to the CCP, who saw détente as the beginning of collusion with imperialist forces who were the sworn enemies of the Chinese people. This view is revealed in Deng Xiaoping's words excerpted from a conversation with a Soviet diplomat in September of 1960:

> We have no doubt that overall you are taking a stand against imperialism. . . . But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak with such esteem about Eisenhower? . . . We would like to ask you . . . on whom you can count when difficulties will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a fraternal socialist country, on China? (Deng et al.)

Deng effectively framed Khrushchev's friendliness towards Eisenhower and the imperialist West. The Chinese hatred of imperialism came at least

partially out of China's history of oppression and the long association of Chinese nationalism with Marxist ideology.

The CCP's disapproval of these policies greatly exasperated Sino-Soviet tensions, contributing to the Sino-Soviet split. In addition to the remarks recorded above, the Chinese waged a polemic struggle against the Soviets. This in turn aggravated the Soviets, further straining the relationship. Perhaps the greatest rhetorical attack on Soviet leadership came from Mao Zedong's comments at the 1957 Moscow conference of world communist leaders. After referencing advocacy by a recently purged Soviet official to conduct a preemptive war in private remarks to Khrushchev, Mao gave an incredibly inflammatory (and reckless) speech advocating aggressive struggle against the imperialist West. Running completely against the conciliatory tone adopted by Khrushchev, Mao spoke of the supremacy of communist military power over imperialist power and of how the socialist nations shouldn't fear nuclear weapons or high casualties (Garver 124–27).

Such blatant questioning of Russian policies understandably aggravated the Soviets. Khrushchev complained at a Warsaw Pact conference in February 1960 that the Chinese had "refused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension . . . and was too insistent on following its own independent policies" (CIA ii). This backlash failed to dissuade the Chinese, who released five statements in April 1960 that denounced peace with the West and advocated continuous struggle (CIA ii). A CIA document points out that the Chinese chose to attack the Soviets using "the most serious charge one Communist party can make against another—the charge of abandonment of revolutionary positions" (CIA iii).

Thus, we see that the Chinese's nationalistically influenced conception of a need to struggle against Western imperialism led them to openly question and challenge Soviet leadership. This greatly aggravated ties between the two countries, ultimately contributing to the Sino-Soviet schism.

Conclusion

This paper has shown how nationalism played different roles in the development of communist ideology in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It has shown how nationalism was wedded to communism in the Chinese case, and how this marriage contributed to the tensions between the CPSU and the CCP that ultimately resulted in the Sino-Soviet split. These difficulties were particularly pronounced in Chinese resistance to Soviet leadership of the world communist movement. They influenced Chinese criticism of the Soviet's handling of uprisings in Eastern Europe. They interfered with the Soviet's efforts to coordinate Cold War military action against the West. Perhaps most destructive to the alliance, they influenced the Chinese's fierce criticism of Khrushchev's attempt at détente

with the West. While not a comprehensive list of the incidents that resulted in the Sino-Soviet split, these tensions contributed greatly to the collapse of the alliance. This suggests that nationalism played a role in the disintegration of the monolithic communist front of the 1950s.

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A Complicated Affair of
Twentieth Century Southeast Asia:
The Causes and Consequences of the
Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Cambodia

Nhi Phan

January 7, 2021 marked the 42nd anniversary of the Vietnamese army and allied forces of Cambodian general Hun Sen overthrowing Pol Pot. Although this invasion took a mere two weeks, the consequences lasted for more than ten years with huge losses for both the Vietnamese and Cambodians. After 1975, Indochina has gone through many changes with different regimes; its geography, however, has remained the same. Even though both Vietnam and Cambodia became communist regimes after winning their independence from France in 1975, they experienced different changes in political ideology. The shift in regime also brought along border conflicts between the two countries (Leighton 448). As a result of this conflict, on December 25, 1978, the Vietnamese army launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia, beginning a period of criticism and isolation from the international community for both Vietnam and the newly established Hanoi-backed Cambodian Salvation Front (Morris 6). In this literature review, I will focus on discussing the factors that contributed to this conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as the consequences that both sides had to face during the conflict.

Vietnam-Cambodia Relationship Before 1975

The Paths to Independence

Vietnam and Cambodia declared their independence from the French in 1945 and 1953, respectively. After declaring their independence, both

countries' economic and social situations were in crisis. The years of exploitation from the French turned Vietnam and Cambodia into poor agrarian societies. Moreover, since both nations were parts of French-Indochina, there were many Vietnamese immigrant laborers who worked in Cambodia and vice-versa (Slocomb 1). These immigrant laborers were called "Viet Kieu" in Cambodia and "Khmer Krom" in Vietnam. After the defeat of France in Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam, both the French and the Viet Minh signed an agreement in Geneva. This agreement stated that a demilitarized zone (DMZ) would be established in Vietnam; following this was the split between North and South Vietnam. Additionally, the agreement also indicated that after the French withdrew their troops from the North and the Viet Minh withdrew their troops from the South, a reunification election would be held. However, this election never happened, since the South Vietnamese did not agree and the United States had stepped in. On the other hand, in Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk Norodom succeeded to his father's throne and formed his own political party, the Sangkum, in 1953. The prince expressed that Cambodia would remain neutral between the two republics of Vietnam and maintain friendly diplomatic relationships with both the North and South (Pouvatchy 441).

Nevertheless, Tai Sung An points out that after gaining their independence from France, both Vietnam and Cambodia went through brutal civil wars. The war left Vietnam split into two regions. While the communists in the North still wanted to reunite the country, the Southern Vietnamese were pro-capitalist (Tai 247). Similarly, Ananada Naidu expresses that, since the establishment of prince Sihanouk's party Sangkum, there were many internal conflicts recorded in Cambodia. The notable names included Lon Nol, who eventually led the military coup against Prince Sinahouk in 1970, and Pol Pot, who later became head of Khmer Rouge Army and Prime Minister of Democratic Campuchia in 1975 (Naidu 961). Pouvatchy also states that during this time period, the communist Vietnamese established supply routes in Cambodia to distribute resources to southern communist Vietnamese soldiers. Additionally, the South Vietnamese government continued efforts to remove Prince Sinahouk in order to establish a pro-American and capitalist system in Cambodia (Pouvatchy 446).

After facing conflicts and revolutionary movements, Prince Sinahouk was removed from power. Lon Nol, who successfully led the military coup, established the pro-American Khmer Republic and proclaimed himself as president of Cambodia in 1970 (Pouvatchy 448). Even though Lon Nol was an anti-communist, he declared war on both North and South Vietnam. Lon Nol started slaughtering Vietnamese laborers in Cambodia after he took power. Thus, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated (Tai 248). Seeing this action of Lon Nol as a threat, the communist Viet-

namese joined hands with Pol Pot, leader of the Khmer Rouge Army, to fight against Lon Nol. As a result, both communist Vietnam and Cambodia achieved their goals. Then in 1975, two major event took place: the communists unified Vietnam and Pol Pot successfully took over Cambodia from Lon Nol and established the Democratic Kampuchea (Tai 250).

Conflicts Arose

In "A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam Invasion of Cambodia" by Pribbenow, he addresses that in May 1975, skirmishes between the two countries arose. The Khmer Rouge initially seized the Vietnamese-held islands in the Gulf of Thailand. They then crossed the Vietnam border and went into the Mekong Delta region. Nonetheless, this did not last long. Vietnam not only mobilized their captured US-made aircrafts and helicopter gunships, but also generated ground and naval forces to recapture their lost territories (Pribbenow 460). Another aspect contributed to the rising conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia was the bitter split of China and the Soviet Union. Both Vietnam and Cambodia supported different sides. While Vietnam gradually got closer to the Soviet Union, the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia fully supported China. Thus, the Vietnam-Cambodia relationship slowly became worse. Pribbenow notes that after 1975, Vietnam demobilized their army and sent their soldiers to different places for economic construction duties. However, after the Khmer Rouge's action of slaughtering and attacking thousands of Vietnamese along the border, Vietnamese armed forces were remobilized. They decided to go into war with Cambodia and stated that they would retaliate against the Pol Pot regime for what it had done (Pribbenow 461). In December 1978, the Heng Samrin–headed and Vietnam-backed Kampuchea United Front for National Salvation (KUF NS) was formed in order to remove Pol Pot from power (Pribbenow 464).

The Invasion

Cambodian Genocide

After taking control of Cambodia in 1975, Pol Pot established the Democratic Kampuchea, and the terror started there. From 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge, or the Pol Pot regime, was responsible for the deaths of millions of Cambodian people; while there was not an exact number of deaths recorded, it could be that anywhere from seven hundred thousand to more than three million people were slaughtered. The killing methods included starving people to death, hanging, and executing using bayonets, knives, or poison (Heuveline 201). Anne Guillou indicates that there were skulls of the victims found with the marks of those weapons used. In order to kill the children of those adult victims, the Khmer Rouge brutally bashed the

children's heads against the Chankiri trees and threw them into pits with the bodies of their dead parents. As such, these places have been infamously named by many historians as the "killing fields" (Guillou 149).

The Khmer Rouge committed these actions because they wanted a societal purge. Pol Pot was a pro-Maoist ideologist. He believed in a society where only peasants could live, a society where people would have the same way of thinking and behaving and would be equal in every aspect. Hinton describes how religions and all sources of freedom were banned. Educated people like teachers, students, monks, and those who lived in the capital city Phnom Penh were arrested and sent to the "killing fields." All public places, including schools, hospitals, and markets were shut down, and money was abolished. People died from starvation, diseases, and executions on a daily basis (Hinton 93). Of the thirty thousand Vietnamese who lived in Cambodia, most were killed and suffered the same fate as the Cambodian people. This offense added upon the killings of Vietnamese people across the border, which incited Vietnam to invade Cambodia (Hinton 95).

Vietnamese Troops Took Over Cambodia

After the establishment of The Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, on December 2, 1978, Cambodian leaders Heng Samrin and Hun Sen were ready for the war against Pol Pot. In the meantime, the Khmer Rouge launched several attacks in the border from Tay Ninh province to the lower Mekong Delta (Pribbenow 470). Vietnam officially launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia on December 25, 1978. During this time, the Vietnamese made use of captured US planes and tanks from the Vietnam War. With those advantages, more than one hundred thousand Vietnamese troops rapidly entered deep into Cambodian territory (Bui 275).

The Vietnamese troops were divided into different divisions. These divisions were led by experienced generals that had fought in the Vietnam War. Cambodian provinces like Stung Treng and Mondulkiri were quickly captured by the 307th and 309th Vietnamese divisions (Pribbenow 472). Thus, the Khmer Rouge were outgunned and outnumbered; they abandoned their captured cities and fled to Thailand to hide in the jungle. After taking most of the provinces in Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge, the next target was Phnom Penh, Cambodia's capital city. Both Diem and Pribbenow agree that this was barely a war between two countries (276; 474). In just a few weeks, from the end of December to January 6, 1979, the Vietnamese troops had taken Phnom Penh. After having declaring that the Khmer Rouge would only need a few months to win the war on January 5, Pol Pot flew out of the capital city on a helicopter to seek support from China and Thailand (Pribbenow 477).

Vietnam's Occupation of Cambodia (1979-1989)

The Establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea

After overthrowing the Pol Pot Regime, the KUFNS and Vietnam established a new government in Cambodia: The People's Republic of Kampuchea. The *Contemporary Southeast Asia* journal presented a draft constitution by president Heng Samrin to his people on June 24, 1979. In this document, Heng Samrin states that Cambodia had suffered from many invasions and political conflicts in the past hundred years; Cambodian people were struggling to gain true national independence and freedom. Now that they had got what they wanted, the People's Republic of Kampuchea would do their best to "build an independent, peaceful, free and happy" nation (Contemporary 177). Furthermore, Heng Samrin also declared that the People's Republic of Kampuchea was independent and had its own "sovereignty and territorial integrity." Nonetheless, he listed elements that could potentially disrupt this independence. According to Heng Samrin, one of these elements was the officials in Beijing, who also supported and provided for Pol Pot during his years ruling Cambodia, and even after he ran away from the Vietnamese invasion. Additionally, the anti-communist US and other reactionary forces were also considered elements that opposed the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (Contemporary 178). This government system, thus, was not recognized by the United Nations and most of the world, and only recognized by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (Swann 99).

Social and Economic Reform

In the treaty "Vietnam-Kampuchea: Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Coordination," it states that Vietnam and Cambodia would cooperate and defend each other. It also declares that both countries should not interfere in each other's "internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefits" (Contemporary 106). Slocomb notes that the People's Republic of Kampuchea still had to face threats from remnants of the Khmer Rouge. Even though they were disbanded, the Khmer Rouge sought help from other countries like China and Thailand while a large number of them also withdrew to the forests and launched small scale attacks (Slocomb 195). On the other hand, the Vietnamese troops did not withdraw from Cambodia after the removal of Pol Pot and instead remained in the country for ten years. There were Vietnamese advisors for every political and economic aspect in Cambodia. Slocomb states that Cambodians started doubting that if the agreement between the countries was true, and they wanted the Vietnamese troops to completely withdraw from their country. This posted a great challenge to the newly established government (Slocomb 197). With Vietnamese sup-

port, the new government had to deal with the threat of the Khmer Rouge and other anti-communist movements. Simultaneously, they also had to focus on rebuilding the country that was completely destroyed by the Khmer Rouge (Slocomb 198).

Even so, five years after the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese took control of the country, circumstances began to improve. In an article about Cambodia's economic and social reform, Gennady J. Chufrin describes the Cambodian economy as flourishing. Particularly, the government had focused on restoring and developing agriculture: the main source of Cambodian economy. It was recorded that the amount of rice produced every year was continuously increasing. In 1983, they produced 2.1 million tons of rice, allowing the government to feed its people, as well as allocate some for export (Chufrin 1143). Additionally, the number of cattle also increased. Chufrin indicates that farmers were also equipped with better farming technology, compared to the primitive methods that were applied before 1979. In addition to rice, other harvests like peanuts, sugar cane, and cotton were also booming. In summary, the government focused on a wide range of economic aspects and successfully improved economic conditions. Chufrin also points out that the government also restored the transportation system that was shut down by the Khmer Rouge. This allowed river ports, sea ports, and aviation to function again (Chufrin 1144). Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese supported Cambodia with trained experts in the educational and medical fields; these experts helped establish higher education institutes, even an institute for foreign language study. These institutions caused the number of students attending school to increase (Chufrin 1146).

Consequences of the Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Cambodia

Isolation and criticism from the international community towards Vietnam and the KUFNS

Soon after the occupation of Vietnam in Cambodia, the Pol Pot Regime—or the Democratic Kampuchea—called for an urgent meeting with members of the United Nations' Security Council. In "The UN in the Cambodia Conflict: UNTAC," it states that during this meeting—excluding the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—all other member countries including the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and France strongly opposed the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia (The). Prince Sihanouk also sided with the Pol Pot Regime to counter the Vietnamese, despite the fact that the prince never agreed with what Pol Pot did to the Cambodian people. In this meeting, Prince Sihanouk called for all member

countries of the UN to stop providing aid for Vietnam and not recognize the new established Cambodian government. However, this resolution was never approved because the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia did not support it (Bach 78).

Furthermore, the UN General Assembly's 34th session marks the official recognition of the UN member countries to the Pol Pot Regime. Representatives of both the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Democratic Kampuchea tried to claim their sovereignty over Cambodia. However, even with the cruelty committed by the Khmer Rouge, it was still recognized as an official government system (Solarz 111). By 1980, only twenty-nine countries would establish diplomatic relations with the new government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. On the other hand, more than eighty countries still accepted the Democratic Kampuchea as an official government. In addition to this, many Western powers like the United States, France, or communist China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all strongly condemned the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia (Swann 98).

The Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1979

Like Vietnam and Cambodia, Vietnam and China were close communist allies before the Vietnam War. When Vietnam fought with the United States during the Vietnam War, China often provided its neighbor with supplies. After communist Vietnam took over Saigon, Beijing also sent them congratulations and regarded the two countries as "close as lips and teeth" (Womack 162–163). Nevertheless, Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated following the major events after 1975, and the invasion of Vietnam in Cambodia was central to this (Dreyer 297–298). The Pol Pot regime was supported by Beijing officials, who would send military specialists to Cambodia and provide them with aid. China was the most important foreign partner for the Democratic Kampuchea. Once the Vietnamese armed forces and its backed-Cambodian army rebelled against the Democratic Kampuchea, China was ready for war against Vietnam (Ciorciari 225). China officially invaded the northern provinces of Vietnam on February 17, 1979. The Chinese troops did not stay in Vietnam for too long, as leader Deng Xiaoping stated that the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 was to "teach the Vietnamese a lesson" (Scalapino 28). Even though Chinese troops only remained in Vietnam for one month, conflicts between the two countries lasted for more than ten years until Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia (Scalapino 33).

Conclusion

The main goal of this literature review is to examine the factors contributing to the conflict between Vietnam-Cambodia and Vietnam-China, as well as its consequences. It also discusses how the international community was involved in the conflict and explores where Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea stood in the world's political arena during this time period. With the invasion and occupation of Vietnam in Cambodia, both countries faced isolation from the international community. Furthermore, Vietnam had to deal with sanctions from the United States and fought a bloody war with China (Slocomb 265). For Cambodia, even though the People's Republic of Cambodia "failed to sustain the revolution," the terror caused by the Khmer Rouge ended and gave people a means to restore their lives (Slocomb 268). This literature review provides different perspectives about the complicated affairs between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China for historians who are researching these topics. Future researchers could focus more on exploring the restoration of Cambodia during the 1980s or the reasons that contributed to the support of the international community for the Pol Pot Regime even after the genocide. These are the two topics that should be asked and researched more in the future, as they are still relevant and crucial to the diplomatic relations between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the 21st century.

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The Female Experience with Nationalism, Feminism, and *Han* in Post-Choson Korea

Midori Raymond

Women constitute roughly half of the population, yet in most patriarchal societies they are placed second to men. Throughout the course of history, there have been several attempts to improve the standing of women within the home and society to match that of their male counterparts. These attempts to achieve gender equality can be categorized as feminism. In South Korea (hereafter Korea), there have been many such attempts. Since the Japanese colonial period, many things have contributed to the rise of modern feminism in Korea; nationalism, speaking out against sexual assault, and the female experience with *han* can be considered as roots of feminism in Korea. The vehicles for and the aims of feminism changed this period, ultimately evolving into what feminism means to Koreans today.

During Japan's thirty-five-year occupation of Korea, nationalism and feminism flourished and suffered. This started with the March First Movement of 1919. In this organized movement, Koreans protested non-violently against Japanese occupation and for Korean independence. Among these protesters were several female students from Ewha Womans University who led some of these demonstrations (Kim, "Mapping," 193). Several female students even sent a petition to the Paris Peace Congress of 1919, in which they appealed for equality of Korean women before doing so for Korean independence (Oh, "From," 48). During this time, many women's organizations were established to give women self-confidence and motivate them to advocate for themselves. Through these protests, many

Korean women gained the respect of Korean men and were seen to be just as equal and as capable as them (Oh, "From," 48). Though the March First Movement started as a purely nationalistic endeavor, women were able to advance their place in society by using this nationalistic fervor as a vehicle for feminism.

Despite the large leaps that women and feminism took in these demonstrations, this movement was ultimately put down by Japanese colonial powers and resulted in many Korean casualties and arrests. One prominent female casualty was Yu Gwan-sun (1902–1920). She was only eighteen years old (Wells 200; "Yu"). Yu had helped to organize the March First Movement in Seoul and later, on the first of April, she organized and participated in yet another independence movement. In this second movement, Yu's parents and seventeen others were killed by the Japanese and many, including Yu, were arrested ("Yu"). Yu was then tortured by the Japanese and eventually murdered in an underground prison due to this severe torture ("Yu"). Thus, as a prominent female activist who became a martyr, Yu Gwan-sun became an example to female activists within the politics of Japanese-occupied Korea. Her courage to fight for nationalistic endeavors surely bolstered the courage of women who fought, and would fight, for feminist endeavors.

Despite the rough ending of the March First Movement, many Christian organizations (especially their female members) kept the conversation of nationalism and feminism going through religious meetings, albeit secretly (Kim, "Mapping," 193). This movement was perhaps the first time that feminism was linked with nationalism in Korea.

During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese government permitted several newspapers to be printed and circulated in the Korean language. Before this, use of the Korean vernacular in public usage had been scarce. This period of occupation saw a slight release of the Japanese's tight grip on Korea, which allowed for a more free and public fostering of strong nationalist (and therefore feminist) sentiments among Koreans and therefore, the liberalization of the press created a larger space for the discussion and debate on gender roles and women. In these newspapers, nationalist and feminist ideas were proposed and championed and women were able to find a new voice in public discourse. One of these newspapers, *Puin* (Woman), coined a new alternative against Confucian ways of thinking about women: *sinyŏsŏng* (new woman) (Kim, "Mapping," 191).

This new ideology asserted that women and girls should seek out education for the benefit of themselves, escape the confines of arranged marriages, and live according to their own consciences (Kim, "Mapping," 191). In this sense, the pride that nationalism fostered in the Korean people effectively cracked the door open for the public advocacy of women. This

new feminist movement—later coined the New Woman movement—meant further independence of the Korean woman from things that had previously limited her: a lack of education and opportunities, loss of rights, and institutionalized oppression. Korean women wanted to be more than a mere extension of their husbands or children—they wanted to be their own person. This was a sharp contrast to the ways of premodern times concerning women, especially those of the Chosŏn period. However, the political sphere during this time was already buzzing with nationalism—feminism was perhaps not so radical of an idea as it might have seemed if nationalist sentiments were not so strong at this time. This is not to say that it was a readily acceptable ideology for all in Korea.

The New Woman movement began with the "wise mother and good wife" ideology, which held that women were to properly educate their children, stand as a supportive and equal spouse to her husband, and be an economical administrator of the household (Suh 18). This was later rejected in favor of the ideology of women's liberation: advocating for women's freedom to participate in love marriages and in anything they had a desire to be a part of or wanted (Suh 19). However, the New Woman movement soon started to receive a lot more negativity from outsiders. The main claims against the New Woman movement and those who were a part of it were that the women were too extravagant, frivolous, easily tempted, and sexually promiscuous (Suh 20). The introduction of the New Woman movement in the press was not responded to favorably by male scholars. Male scholars attempted to steer the conversation away from female liberation and gender and back to nationalistic and patriotic discourse (Wells 194). Like many movements before and after it, the New Woman movement experienced its highs and lows.

When the New Woman movement was still at its height, the idea of embodying modernity was very closely tied to the dress and hairstyles of the day. New hairstyles and new clothing trends communicated the discourse of female liberation that women of the New Woman movement had advanced. Women's clothing became more exposing and began to allow for greater physical mobility that was not offered in traditional womenswear (Choi 241). Bobbed hair and short skirts were the iconic look of a "new woman" (Yoo 300). One female intellectual, Kim Hwallan, argued that this bobbed look created of a uniform hairstyle which was a step forward for women and therefore promoted nationalistic endeavors (Yoo 302). Because of the defiant stylistic look of New Women, all signs of a woman's marriage (if she was married) were effectively taken away (Choi 241). It is evident that women were taking the reins and defining beauty and femininity themselves, rather than relying on their male counterparts (Yoo 301).

Because of the important role that clothing and hairstyles played in the New Woman movement, the New Woman movement became more visibly apparent. Women took the New Woman ideology to a new level—it existed not only in written text and spoken discourse, but also in clothing stores and hair salons. Korean women were beginning to define themselves *for* themselves. By so doing, they created a new societal ideal that they believed all women should strive to become. Those who embodied this new ideal effectively became living examples of the ideologies of the New Woman movement, spreading the message of such to anyone who so much as looked at them walking by.

Nevertheless, all of this changed drastically during the end of the colonial period. By the this time, the Japanese were unhappy with the strong nationalist sentiments among Koreans; their response was severe. The Korean language became banned in all contexts and Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese names and speak Japanese. Because of this, all signs of Korean nationalism were completely crushed, taking any form of feminism down with them as Japan forced Korea to integrate more into the Japanese empire. Koreans were effectively stripped of their national identity and Korean women were robbed of any advancements they had made for themselves that had not been hindered by male-dominant nationalism.

However, it could be argued that Korean nationalism crushed parts of Korean feminism before the Japanese did. While nationalism did serve as a vehicle for feminism during the colonial period, it was also an opponent to feminism. Feminism often had to compete with nationalism for space in public discourse. This is especially evident when looking at the discourse (or lack thereof) in the press during the later colonial period due to Japanese censorship. The gender issues and female liberation ideologies that female writers brought up in this limited space were debated and rejected by their male counterparts. Feminist discourse was overpowered by nationalistic discourse, and women were often put in the position to choose one or the other; this continued into the post-colonial period.

When the Japanese were eventually expelled by the Allies, Korea was once more an independent state. After unspeakable horrors and tight political control on the part of the Japanese, Koreans were left to pick up the pieces. The new constitution of the new Republic of Korea granted women the same basic rights as men, but these inked-in rights did not translate into reality (Kim, "Mapping," 194). As was the case during the colonial period, the nationalistic attitudes that had been crushed began to resurface, and this continued to be at the cost of feminism. Women were forced to pick sides between nationalism and feminism—they could not advance agendas for both ideologies. As a result, nationalism often trumped feminism. Additionally, the patriarchal discourse of nationalism in Korea often

prioritized men over women, sometimes even to the extent of exploiting women. This exploitation was even construed to be glorified self-sacrifice of women for the benefit of the nation (Kim, "Should," 110–11).

Towards the end of the twentieth century, feminist discourse began to shift and feminist groups began to focus their discourse onto sexual assault and violence. It is important to note that prior to this shift in discourse, the actual Korean word meaning "rape" was never actually used, as it was considered unutterable and was usually referred to only by various euphemisms (Jung 275).

The worst case of sexual assault against women in Korea was near the end of Japanese occupation. Though this period was during the middle of the twentieth century, victims of this sexual assault did not come forward and share their experiences until the 1980s. It started in 1938 when a "volunteer-based" organization called the Comfort Women was established in Korea by the Japanese military. Young women from age twelve and older were recruited by either their teachers or Japanese military officials to perform sexual favors for Japanese soldiers. It is estimated that there were between 50,000 and 200,000 women and girls in the Comfort Women (Kim, "Should," 113).

Though this organization started as a so-called volunteer operation, some were recruited on the false notion that they would be employed with good wages, but eventually, participation became forced (Lee 513). Many rightly refer to the Comfort Women as a form of sexual slavery. In extreme cases, a Japanese soldier would rape a girl in front of her family, and as violated daughters were undesirable in Korea, the soldiers knew that her family would be more willing to allow her abduction (Lee 513–514). Once integrated into the Comfort Women system, if a girl or woman refused to perform these sexual acts, she was threatened with other forms of physical abuse and torture, and sometimes even death (Askin 14). This excessive rape (many victims served dozens of men each day), caused many health problems (Lee 515; Askin 16). The uteruses of many women collapsed to the point where hysterectomies became increasingly necessary and many women were rendered entirely sterile either by force or as a result of repeated rape (Askin 15). Women that were pregnant upon abduction or became pregnant often miscarried because of rape, beatings, or forced abortions (Askin 19). Emotional, physical, and mental scarring never ceased for these victims.

One of the survivors of this heinous organization, Kim Bok-Dong, shared her story in an interview for a YouTube channel called *Asian Boss*. She stated that she was taken from her family with the belief that she would be working at a factory and would return by the time she was old enough to marry—she was only fourteen years old at the time (Asian Boss 1:56–

3:14). When she arrived at her first comfort station, she was examined by a doctor and then raped by a Japanese officer. She described that first experience to the interviewer:

> The first time, I got dragged into one of the rooms and [was] beaten up a bit so I had to comply. When the guy finished, I was bleeding badly because it was my first time. The bed sheet was soaked in blood. After they were done, I went back to my dorm upstairs, where I saw two girls crying because they just had the same thing done to them. We were like, 'How can we live like this? We're much better off dead.' We tried to figure out how to commit suicide. (Asian Boss 4:49–5:19)

Kim and the two girls were able to get a very potent alcoholic beverage and attempted to drink themselves to death. They would have been successful in their attempt, but their absence had Japanese officials looking for them and they were able to find and save the girls by pumping their stomachs (Asian Boss 6:31). Kim said that this caused permanent damage to her stomach (Asian Boss 6:49).

When the Comfort Women organization was abolished at the end of World War II in 1945, many of the girls and women had died in captivity (Askin 20). And even if they did make it to the end of the war, Japanese soldiers used these women as bullet shields and abandoned them in foreign countries. They even held mass killings in attempts to cover it up (Askin 21). For the survivors, there was no space for a conversation about sexual assault in Korea. No one could even bring themselves to utter the word "rape" in public. Various Confucian values played the largest role in this silence and attributed to further hardships in the lives of survivors.

In traditional Korean society, women were expected to be sexually pure before marriage and faithful during marriage. Women who violated this expectation and women who were violated were considered "spoiled goods," and were denied many things such as proper medical care, companionship, and sympathy (Askin 22–23). As a result, the hardships for these women did not stop and they were often ostracized and rejected by society and their families. Suicide became an alternative for many. Women who had been taken as slaves when they were teenagers did not have a sufficient education or skill set to find a job or be married, so in order to survive, many of these women had to turn to the very thing that they were forced to endure for years: prostitution (Askin 24). Despite hard evidence and numerous testimonies from survivors, Japan has yet to take legal responsibility for this inhumane organization.

Though this organized system of mass sexual violence against women was eventually disbanded, sexual assault against women persisted in Korea, especially of those in the entertainment industry. In the early post-Korean

War years, military and government dictators would demand sexual services from popular female singers. Even the managers of these popular artists would sexually abuse and exploit them (Oh, "K-pop," 76).

In more recent years, the film industry has been no exception to sexual violence. In 2017 an anonymous female actress was raped on camera in an unscripted sex scene to, as the film director put it, "'stimulate the actress's emotions' and 'to make the film more realistic'" (Kim, "After," 506). This actress chose to remain anonymous perhaps because women who *did* openly accuse men of sexual assault were often sued for claims of false accusation and defamation (Kim, "After," 506). Thus, women's choice to remain silent about their sexual assault experiences was not unique to the victims of the Comfort Women and remains today.

The internet has also been a vehicle for feminism and the recognition of problems with sexual assault against women in Korea. The #MeToo movement gained a lot of ground in Korea, as well as other hashtags such as #iamafeminist. Following the #MeToo wave in America, Korean women began to come forward with their sexual assault experiences using this hashtag in 2018. This movement gave them the confidence they needed to do so, as they saw that they were not the only ones who had experienced such assault (as the hashtag implies). It is important to note that these new and increasing claims of sexual assault does not mean that sexual assault against women in Korea was becoming more frequent, only that claims of such were becoming more frequent. One could even argue that the victims of the Comfort Women organization that spoke out were the forerunners of the Korean #MeToo movement (Hasunuma 99).

Additionally, the hashtag #iamafeminist gave women a similar platform to share their experiences and opinions, only this hashtag allowed for discussion on any aspect of feminism, not just sexual assault. #iamafeminist even preceded the #MeToo movement in Korea, so it could be argued that this hashtag was another precursor to the #MeToo movement.

Another event that primed Korean women for the #MeToo movement was the rampant secretive invasion of privacy during the Park Geun-Hye administration (2013–2017) (Hasunuma 99). Hidden cameras had been placed in women's bathrooms, changing rooms, and other private spheres. The footage these cameras recorded was uploaded to the internet as pornography for the financial benefit of the uploader (Hasunuma 99). The disappointing lack of support from the government for victimized women was felt sharply by Korean girls and women. The #MeToo movement provided a space for these women to make their voices heard.

As was the situation with the Comfort Women, this outspokenness of Korean women did not result in a favorable response from the opposite sex, regardless of the platform used. As previously stated, women who

spoke out against sexual offenders faced things such as accusations of defamation, social stigma, and rejection. In addition, a woman's professional work would be undervalued by others if she came forward with sexual assault allegations (Hasunuma 102). Often women were not believed or were blamed for the sexual assault they experienced, which further reinforced the idea of rape as a myth (Shim 146).

While nationalism and sexual assault against women separately fueled the feminist fire of modern Korea, the two phenomena were not mutually exclusive. The Comfort Women issue certainly demonstrates this. When the victims spoke up about their experiences, many Koreans were appalled and enraged (even though many Koreans also shamed and ostracized these same women). If anything, this issue only fueled the negative sentiments Koreans had towards the Japanese from the occupation period, thus reinforcing Korean nationalism (Kim, "Feminism"). This is because the Comfort Women issue gave Koreans another reason to band together against a common enemy. Because sexual assault was becoming more central to feminism during the time when the Comfort Women issue was uncovered, this surge of nationalism surrounding mass sexual assault was to the benefit of feminism. However, the atrocity of the sexual assault of the Comfort Women was viewed as a political crime, not a crime against women (Kim, "Feminism"). Therefore, the nationalistic emotions triggered by the Comfort Women issue did not completely parallel the aims of feminism in Korea at that time. Korea had missed the mark in the sight of the victims and feminists, because the latter viewed it as a crime against women. This publicization of the Comfort Women issue was still an important event in making sexual assault more recognized and validated in Korean society. This *was* one of the aims of feminism.

In the past, sexual assault against women has even been used as a way to suppress other political movements and sentiments. For example, in 1986 a young woman named Kwon Insook was taken into custody for being a former student political activist. She was tortured into giving the police the names of other activists (among other things), and was sexually violated by police officer Moon Guidong at Puchun Police Station (Jung 268). This shows the lengths the former Korean administrations were willing to go in order to suppress the political oppositions of women. That said, there have been several laws passed by the Korean government since then to prevent these situations and punish those guilty of sexual assault (not just against women). For example, in 2010 the Korean government passed the Sexual Violence Prevention and Victims Protection Act, which has been amended since its original passing. Among other things, this act provides support to victims and their families and puts into place measures

to prevent sexual assault. This act even states that there will be one week a year dedicated to sexual assault prevention (National).

Korean women have struggled in the political and moral sphere of Korea for the entirety of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As soon as they found a voice for themselves in public discourse, it was drowned out and crushed by outside political force or domestic national sentiments. Their bodies were repeatedly violated and abused in unimaginable ways. And when they did speak out, they were shamed, quieted, rejected, and dismissed. Many of their efforts to improve their standing in Korean society and culture yielded no fruit. This disappointment, frustration, indignation, and unconscionability plagued Korean women.

All of these feelings and events culminate into one idea: *han*. In her 2006 article, Kim asserts that in this context, *han* "represents the image of traditional Korean women's suffering, pain, and crying, as well as their resilience throughout Korean history. A loose translation of the term would be, 'the sorrow and anger that grows'" ("Feminism"). Surely the events of the Japanese colonial period added to the female experience with *han*, especially where the Comfort Women organization is concerned. The continual strife in politics and with sexual assault also added to this experience with *han*. This notion of *han* surely motivated Korean women to continue to speak out against female oppression on the internet through the #MeToo movement and the #iamafeminist hashtag.

Upon this closer analysis of nationalism, sexual assault against women, and *han*, their respective and collective relationships with feminism in Korea during the colonial period and after is clear. Nationalism gave women a voice in public discourse and challenged traditional ideas concerning women. This began in the first period of Japanese colonial rule with the March First Movement and vernacular newspapers and continued with the New Woman movement in the second period. This New Woman movement experienced its own ups and downs, from trends in dress and appearance, to available space in limited public discourse. To Korean women, these feministic movements meant freedom and independence from customs and traditions that called for the silencing and submission of women. Korean women yearned to function as their own people in society and not as an attachment to their male relatives. However, this seemingly steady rise of feminism and female discourse was crushed by Japanese responses to Korean nationalism and did not reappear until Korean independence. Nationalism was key to the rise of feminism but was also a tool to put feminism down, as Korean nationalism itself played a part in the suppression of feminism and female discourse during and after the Japanese colonial period.

Systematic sexual assault cases, such as the Comfort Women organization, were major events in the lives of Korean women. The aftermath of such showed the true attitudes towards sexual assault in the patriarchal Korean society, as well as the treatment of women who had experienced sexual assault in the same context. These horrific incidences did not motivate Korean society to take more drastic steps in preventing and dealing with sexual assault domestically, as it persisted in the entertainment industry and under recent presidential administrations. As seen with various internet hashtags and movements, women have not given up on rectifying the sexual assault issue in Korea. Sexual assault has become a key issue within feminism. The culmination of these experiences and environments added to Korean women's experience with *han*, which surely serves as a motivation for the resilience of Korean women. All of these things contributed to the rise and evolution of feminism in modern Korea—from becoming exemplar mothers to raise the country's next great generation of leaders, to cutting their hair and educating themselves for themselves, and to fighting for recognition of and justice to crimes committed against women. Thus, feminism in Korea has evolved and changed with time, and it is certain that it will continue to do so in the future.

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