Moral Perspectives on U.S. Security Policy: Views from the LDS Community

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The Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 1986. Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

The Pearl of Great Price. 1986. Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Preface

Toward a Morally Sustainable American National Security Posture

Valerie M. Hudson

Kerry M. Kartchner

The issue of moral perspectives on U.S. security policy, particularly as viewed by Latter-day Saints, is extremely interesting, important, and probably long overdue as a symposium topic. The idea for this symposium began in 1992, when our mutual expertise in national security affairs and our long-standing friendship lent us the confidence needed to plan such an event. Two realizations provided intellectual impetus. First, we realized that over the last several decades many active Latter-day Saints had made national security affairs their profession. A few had even reached some of the highest levels in government and academia. In these individuals we saw valuable, living examples of how to apply restored gospel truths to urgent questions of national policy. However, many of these individuals had no knowledge of other active Latter-day Saints wrestling with the same questions. We felt it would be profitable to bring together some of the best Latter-day Saint (LDS) academics and professionals specializing in national security affairs today, that we might all contribute to the formation of a community dialogue in this field.

We came to a second realization as we pondered the breakdown of the Cold War national security consensus in the United States. The erosion of that consensus, which was based on containment, strategic nuclear deterrence, and extended deterrence, ushered in a new frontier in security studies. Containment was fundamentally a reactive policy. Could it now be replaced with a proactive one? Instead of analyzing what we must do to stop our enemy, could we ask what the U.S. should do, absent that enemy? In our minds, these realizations of having a sizable network of LDS national security scholars and professionals and entering a new age in U.S. security studies dovetailed nicely. Could we move toward a morally sustainable security posture that would replace the morally ambiguous U.S. posture of the Cold War period?

The symposium, entitled “Moral Perspectives on American Security Policy: Views from the Community of LDS Scholars,” was held 30 September–1 October 1993 at the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies on the Brigham Young University campus in Provo, Utah. The threefold purpose of the symposium was to 1) achieve a better understanding of the emerging national security agenda and the challenges it poses for developing a morally sustainable defense posture; 2) develop an appreciation for what we, as Latter-day Saints whose profession is national security policy, can contribute to the process of establishing this morally sustainable national security consensus; and 3) form an improved network of relationships among LDS scholars in the national security profession.

This volume, published by the Kennedy Center, represents the proceedings of the symposium. We anticipate it will benefit those members of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints with an interest in international affairs or, more specifically, national security issues. However, any reader interested in exploring the tensions between traditional Judeo-Christian teachings and twentieth-century national security policy will find the issues discussed herein enlightening and provocative.

The organization of this volume reflects the symposium’s structure. Following Kerry M. Kartchner’s introduction, papers and remarks given during the symposium’s three panels are contained in three parts. The first three panels or parts discuss the three key components of any national security strategy. Part I examines what our national security objectives should be. (Although not a part of the first panel, the symposium’s keynote address by Robert S. Wood is included in Part I as chapter 5.) Part II investigates the current and foreseeable threats to our national security. In addition, it contains a paper presented by Eugene England in which he argues that our current militaristic thinking is a threat to us; thus, England advocates a Christian pacifist ethic as a means of securing the United States of America. Part III offers an analysis of morally justifiable and unjustifiable means to achieve our objectives in the face of those threats. Each panel not only discusses the secular aspects of U.S. national security policy but delves into the moral insights, proscriptions, and prescriptions offered by sacred scripture and doctrine. In the conclusion, Valerie M. Hudson analyzes areas of consensus and dissensus among participants.

It may seem ironic that we have waited until after the Cold War to organize the first-ever symposium of LDS experts on U.S. security policy, given the many moral crises that marked the post–World War II era. Perhaps a “critical mass” of LDS scholars with professional interest and experience in national security affairs first needed to develop. Nevertheless, this symposium was both timely and appropriate. Despite the perceived decline in the importance of security issues, questions of war and peace are still relevant in the post–Cold War era. Indeed, after the Berlin Wall’s collapse and the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a political entity, security issues continue to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Among the agenda items are dealing with the prospective proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, establishing criteria for committing U.S. troops to peacekeeping and/or peacemaking operations abroad, formulating U.S. policy toward various regional conflicts, deciding the future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the East, and developing effective responses to the rising tide of terrorism. These issues currently preoccupy policy makers in Washington, D.C., as well as national security scholars nationwide, and all have profound moral implications.

Furthermore, the field of security studies, like its parent field, international relations, is undergoing nothing short of a revolution, with the emergence of new issues, questions, methodologies, and perspectives—changes that characterize a classic paradigm shift. Consequently, national security scholars and practitioners are obliged to sort through what is still relevant, discard what is no longer relevant, and propose new ways of thinking about security issues. In fact, a dynamic process of building a new U.S. national security consensus is underway, destined to replace the old Cold War consensus. As Latter-day Saints and national security professionals, we have an unprecedented opportunity to contribute to this process, define our national security interests in morally sustainable terms, help identify legitimate threats to our nation’s
physical and spiritual integrity, and clarify a hierarchy of morally justifiable means and responses to those threats.

The challenge of this symposium was not to dictate what Latter-day Saints should think regarding the moral dilemmas of contemporary security policy but to raise questions for their consideration and determine the range of perspectives on these issues within the LDS professional and scholarly community. In this respect, our efforts were successful. We can now make a preliminary assessment of that community’s prospective contributions to the development of a morally sustainable national security posture. Considering the presentations published in this volume, we believe Latter-day Saints are in a position to provide moral leadership in formulating and executing our national security agenda for several reasons.

First, we are committed to the United States’ divine role as “the Lord’s base of operations.” Therefore, the most important national security challenges are those that threaten the viability of this base, internally and externally. For this base of operations to continue functioning effectively, the U.S. must remain strong and independent, prosper economically, and retain the moral high ground in international relations by promoting peaceful resolution of conflict wherever possible. It is imperative that we define America’s role in the world in positive, morally sustainable terms. The question now is not so much, “What are we against?” as, “What are we for?” The most pressing need throughout the world is something to believe in, hope for, and strive toward. In this regard, America’s three principal objectives in this dispensation, as stressed by J. Reuben Clark, Jr., should be reiterated: “America must defend human freedom, America must be the foremost proponent of peace, and America must be a source of moral strength for the rest of the world” (Hickman and Hillam 1973, 437). The United States of America’s strength, more than ever before, lies in its ideals and principles. Therefore, we as Latter-day Saints have a responsibility to make a relevant, timely, and significant contribution to shaping the national security agenda.

Second, we appreciate and support the principles of human dignity and freedom enshrined in the U.S. Constitution as divinely inspired and sanctioned. We believe these principles should apply to all humankind and not just to those who live in the Western industrialized democracies (Doctrine and Covenants 98:5–6; 101:77–80; 109:54). We appreciate that the greatest freedom and the essence of liberty is not security but freedom of conscience—freedom to think, believe, worship, and otherwise conduct our lives as our conscience dictates. However, we also realize that freedom of conscience cannot flourish or prosper without freedom from physical threat and oppression.

Third, based on our faith, we believe we can effectively discern legitimate threats to U.S. security. Fourth, we have recourse to divine revelation and inspired leadership to define the moral choices we face as a nation and as individuals, discern the consequences of those choices, and determine appropriate decisions. Fifth, we recognize that evil is an objective reality capable of taking political forms and, therefore, that morally right and wrong choices exist, even in relation to national security policy preferences.

Finally, we believe this is the final dispensation. We are aware of the calamities that have been prophesied and that will surely come to pass, short of widespread repentance. Consequently, we keenly appreciate the need for personal and national
righteousness. There can be no doubt that this admonition relates directly to our national security: “Behold, this is a choice land, and whatsoever nation shall possess it shall be free from bondage, and from captivity, and from all other nations under heaven, if they will but serve the God of the land, who is Jesus Christ, who hath been manifested by the things which we have written” (Ether 2:12).

We hope this volume provides a catalyst for further examination of this admonition’s many implications and for dialogue that contributes to the broader national debate regarding U.S. security policy as we approach the twenty-first century. We also hope that this will not be the last symposium of its kind and that the community dialogue begun here will expand in breadth and depth.

We appreciate the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies and BYU Religious Education for their sponsorship and help in making this symposium possible. We extend special thanks to R. Lanier Britsch, director of the Kennedy Center, for his unflagging support. We also thank Lisa Bowen and other staff members who worked on many aspects of this program, as well as contributors to the David M. Kennedy Center Trust Endowment, which provides funds for research programs, grants, and symposia.

We appreciate Kirk A. Hawkins’s efforts in helping prepare this publication. We also express our gratitude to Amy Lynn Andrus and Grant Paul Skabelund of Kennedy Center Publications for their editing and feedback. Finally, Matthew P. Scherer’s poster for the symposium, which also adorns this volume’s cover, continues to inspire us.
Introduction
The Moral Challenges of the Emerging National Security Agenda

Kerry M. Kartchner

Reviewing the broad outlines of the new national security agenda that is emerging in the Cold War’s aftermath and contrasting it with the traditional Cold War agenda will help place the following symposium presentations in perspective.

The old national security agenda represented a consensus forged through rigorous public debate among scholars, citizens, and policy makers over a period of forty-five years. While many aspects of that agenda were subject to considerable disagreement and debate, the basic elements were widely recognized and accepted. For example, there was broad, bipartisan consensus on the overall objectives of U.S. foreign and military policy. These objectives were to deter strategic nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies (deterrence), contain the expansion of communist ideological and political influence (containment), and deter a Soviet conventional attack on our European allies (extended deterrence).

Likewise, there was wide agreement on the three principal threats to U.S. security during the Cold War, and they corresponded directly with the United States’ main objectives: Soviet strategic nuclear forces, communist ideology, and Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. Of these, Soviet nuclear weapons were considered the most significant. In fact, Soviet superiority in nuclear counterforce capabilities constituted the first real external threat to the survival of the U.S. in our nation’s history. While many aspects of this threat were subject to intense debate, such as the precise character of the U.S.–Soviet strategic balance or the match between Soviet and U.S. military goals and strategy, the fact could not be denied that the Soviet Union presented the U.S. with its most serious ideological and strategic challenge throughout the post–World War II era. Concern with the ideological threat of communism dominated not only much of the national literature during the Cold War but figured prominently in Mormon political literature of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

Finally, although the reliability of the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact allies was debated, Soviet conventional superiority in Europe was never really doubted and posed the principal threat to American allies in Central Europe. This threat largely precipitated the U.S. policy and strategy of extended deterrence, and some analysts believe that the operational requirements of extended deterrence drove the development of large strategic nuclear force arsenals. In any case, these threats were widely recognized as global, ideologically motivated, and predominantly military in character.

The principal U.S. approach to addressing these threats was establishing and maintaining a bipolar balance of power, primarily through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Militarily, this included relying heavily on a triad of strategic nuclear forces, consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers maintained at relatively high alert rates to counter the danger of surprise attack, and European-based nuclear and conventional tripwire forces to deter a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe and to underwrite the extended deterrence mission. Formally negotiated arms control agreements also constituted a key method of stabilizing the East–West nuclear arms competition and represented an attempt to moderate the resources devoted to superpower military confrontation. The bipolar character of the international security environment, and the high stakes associated with the nuclear and ideological standoff, led both sides to view the Cold War competition in zero-sum terms and devote substantial resources to military defense and global involvement.

But these considerations now seem almost quaintly anachronistic. The emerging national security agenda is the product of several factors, including the end of the Cold War and the consequent realignment of U.S. foreign and military priorities (particularly the desire to reap a "peace dividend"), the rise of advanced military technologies as well as the accompanying pressures and opportunities for developing new tactics and strategies, and the outcome and perceived lessons of the Persian Gulf War. The major elements of this new national security agenda are becoming evident in key national security documents, speeches given by Bush and Clinton administration officials, and recent studies by academic, industry, and military institutions.

As a consequence of the debate over this new security agenda, the focus of U.S. foreign and defense policy is shifting from emphasizing national security narrowly defined to global security and regional stability in a much broader sense. Supranational interests are expected to transcend purely national interests; hence, much of the initiative in current U.S. foreign policy is driven by multinational institutions such as the United Nations. A trend in the international employment of U.S. forces away from unilateralism toward multilateralism is also emerging. And preoccupation with international (or external) security sources is giving way to a greater appreciation for the domestic economic dimensions of security. At least, these are trends many officials and defense analysts have identified and would like to encourage.

This emerging national security agenda produces new answers to questions of U.S. national security interests, new threats to those interests, and new means needed to respond to those threats. Despite cataclysmic changes in the international security environment, certain fundamental U.S. national interests endure unmodified. These include the survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation; the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people; global and regional stability that encourages peaceful change and progress; open, democratic, and representative political systems worldwide; and an open international trading and economic system that benefits all participants.

In addition to these enduring general objectives, three new national security objectives have emerged that go well beyond the traditional concerns of U.S. military policy: demilitarization and defense conversion, democratization and regional self-determination, and economic reform and market liberalization—especially in the newly independent states of Eastern Europe (Aspin and Powell 1993). Moreover, four new dangers, or threats, are shaping U.S. national security strategy and helping prioritize the allocation of U.S. defense resources. The first is regional instabilities and conflicts that
could threaten vital U.S. interests. Reportedly, this is the main threat driving U.S. force posture and defense budget considerations (Aspin 1993b). Specific regions of concern to U.S. policy makers include the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf (Iraq and Iran), the Balkans, certain areas of Africa (Somalia), and India–Pakistan.

The second threat concerns proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery (ballistic missiles in particular). Complicating our response to this particular threat is the fact that regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction are often not susceptible to the traditional instruments and methods of deterrence and crisis management. The traditional approach to deterrence (i.e., threatening massive punitive retaliation) is unlikely to succeed in many instances due to differing strategic cultures, the U.S.’s demonstrated reluctance to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in regional crises, and the increased likelihood that regional adversaries will have a greater stake in the outcome of their regional conflicts than the U.S.

The third threat identified by current national decision makers concerns a weak domestic economy that could undermine U.S. influence and military supremacy in the emerging international security environment. According to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, “America’s economic strength is central to its security. The massive federal budget deficit, sagging U.S. productivity, inadequate competitiveness and low economic growth are major challenges to our security” (Aspin 1993a, 4). Put simply, “In the long-run, our ability to remain a superpower depends upon our economic might” (Aspin 1993b). Internal threats to the establishment and stabilization of democracy in the former Soviet Union’s newly independent nations constitute the fourth danger underscoring the emerging U.S. security agenda.

New objectives and new threats require the development of new means. Military instruments of policy that were appropriate to the Cold War objectives of deterrence and containment are not necessarily relevant to the new objectives of demilitarization, democratization, and foreign economic reform. Furthermore, traditional means and methods may not deter new dangers. In addition, the expectation of a “peace dividend” and the Clinton administration’s emphasis on domestic political issues has produced pressures to reduce military spending.

The most significant priority shift among the available instruments of national military power is the declining relevance of nuclear weapons. There is a general perception that a global nuclear war is no longer a credible threat and, therefore, that large nuclear forces on high alert are no longer needed. The perceived irrelevance of nuclear weapons has been further reinforced by the fact that the United States’ nuclear arsenal failed to deter Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait and that nuclear weapons played no significant role in his defeat or the achievement of other U.S. national security objectives during the Persian Gulf conflict. Consequently, over the past few years many strategic nuclear force programs have been cancelled (small ICBM, MX rail garrison) or scaled back (B-2, Trident), and a series of dramatic nuclear arms reduction agreements has been signed. Ballistic missile defense is yet another instrument of policy whose programmatic priorities have changed significantly. The Strategic Defense Initiative program has been reconfigured to place budgetary emphasis on near-term deployment of theater missile defense, while reconstituting the national ballistic missile defense
program as a long-term research and development effort.

**Moral Challenges of the New Security Agenda**

While the new security agenda outlined above marks a significant step toward defining and establishing a post–Cold War political paradigm, its moral implications have yet to be fully explored or tested. For example, the new security agenda does not completely resolve questions regarding several key issues with deep moral ramifications, including the following: 1) What is the proper role of the U.S. in the post–Cold War world? 2) Is “peace” in its secular sense obtainable in the world today? 3) What priority should we give internal threats to our national security? 4) To what extent should we hold individual leaders accountable for the bloodshed and destruction rampant in the world today? 5) When, where, and under what circumstances should the U.S. be prepared to commit military power and forces on behalf of our friends and allies abroad? Each of these issues has substantial implications for the new U.S. security objectives of demilitarization, democratization, and economic reform, as well as the resource allocation choices associated with them.

1) **What is the proper role of the U.S. in the post–Cold War world?** The most important moral issue associated with defining new national security interests concerns the debate over the U.S.’s role in the world. From its resolution will flow the answers to many other critical foreign and defense policy questions we face in the post–Cold War era. Should the U.S. strive to maintain the position of international primacy in which it finds itself after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

On one hand, some argue that striving to maintain U.S. primacy is both futile and unnecessary because new and rival great powers will inevitably arise, and resisting this development is useless (Layne 1993). Other opponents of U.S. primacy argue that, since war among the most powerful actors in the world is unlikely today, international primacy is no longer the security imperative it was in the Cold War era (Jervis 1993). On the other hand, advocates of a larger U.S. role argue that “the sustained international primacy of the U.S. is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world” (Huntington 1993, 83).

Of course, through additional scripture we, as Latter-day Saints, gain insight into the role, function, and importance of the U.S. in this dispensation. Modern scripture tells us that America is a land of promise prepared by God (1 Nephi 2:20); a choice land above all others, free from bondage and captivity (Ether 2:7–10, 12); a consecrated sanctuary (2 Ne. 1:5–7); a land of liberty where no kings shall rule (2 Nephi 10:11); and a land fortified by God (2 Nephi 10:12). Certainly these scriptural assertions make clear that America will be literally protected by God from external threats, and they prescribe the conditions necessary for the fulfillment of this promise.

Indeed, Ezra Taft Benson (1962) termed America “the Lord’s base of operations.” But can the U.S. perform this function and remain diplomatically isolationist or militarily and economically weak relative to other great powers? With regard to America’s role in the world today, perhaps one policy analyst said it best:
This is the single most important question facing us today, for it reflects how we see ourselves and how we want others to see us; and it provides the foundation stone for a viable security posture. In establishing the role that will serve us best strategically, we must demonstrate true global leadership rather than claim global preeminence. We must lead by the strength not of our military prowess but of our ideas and ideals, our values, our way of life, and our standard of living without feeling it necessary, feasible, or even appropriate to “Americanize” the world. We must appreciate that one can possess the strength of a superpower without having to claim the status of a superpower. (Foster 1993, 22)

2) Is “peace” in its secular sense obtainable in the world today? Or has peace been taken from the world for the duration of this dispensation? The Lord stated in the preface to the Doctrine and Covenants that “the hour is not yet, but is nigh at hand, when peace shall be taken from the earth” (Doctrine and Covenants 1:35). If peace has been taken from the earth, exactly what dangers do we face? Will we discern legitimate threats to our national security in a timely fashion? And will we have the means and willpower to respond appropriately?

These questions go to the heart of our prognostications about the nature and course of international relations in the post–Cold War era. There are two schools of thought. Are we “heading for a dark new period of aggressive nationalism and tribal animosity, one that portends the collapse of all international order,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski believes (Fukuyama 1993, 15)? Or is the realm of “international relations as we have understood it in the past—the realm of war, struggle between nations, and traditional diplomacy—. . . applicable to smaller and smaller parts of the world” or to those parts of the world that are poor, underdeveloped, undemocratic, and unstable (15)?

Certainly peace can be brought about by vigorous proselyting and conversion on a societal scale, as in the epoch cases of Enoch and Melchizedek. But if peace has indeed been taken from the world, the implications for our national security are profound. If secular peace is unobtainable and global conflict is unavoidable, perhaps the best we can hope for is to limit the damage to our national interests. A strategy of damage limitation would stress strategic and civil defenses, a survivable nuclear force posture, protection of U.S. forces and interests abroad (for example, through theater missile defenses), other forms of continental defense, and consideration of counterforce preemption (as a means of preemptively destroying an adversary’s capability to inflict damage). It could also be a prescription for isolationism. How, then, do we balance the trade-offs between our desire to fulfill America’s destiny and the exigencies of limiting the inevitable destruction associated with evil’s predominance in the final dispensation?

3) What priority should we give internal threats to our national security? Traditionally, scholars of U.S. security policy have devoted little attention to the internal dimensions of U.S. national security. However, one of the most prominent threats to national security cited throughout the Book of Mormon concerns the spread of secret combinations and domestic moral degeneration, leading to a breakdown of civil order and inevitable vulnerability to external predators: “And whatsoever nation shall uphold such secret combinations, to get power and gain, until they shall spread over the nation, behold, they shall be destroyed” (Ether 8:22). In fact, the scriptures suggest that America will be secure from dangers posed by foreign nations: “And this land shall be a land of
liberty unto the Gentiles. . . . And I will fortify this land against all other nations. And he that fighteth against Zion shall perish, saith God” (2 Nephi 10: 11–13; Ether 2:12). These scriptures suggest that, as long as the majority remains relatively righteous, viable threats to our nation’s security can come only from internal sources.

Among the internal threats we will almost certainly face is increasing terrorism on U.S. soil, a risk associated with greater U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts and preeminence in world affairs. There are suspicions that the bombers of New York’s World Trade Center wanted to kill forty to fifty thousand Americans. We do not know through what series of fortunate coincidences this was avoided. In any event, we will likely be forced to devote increasingly greater resources to internal security and the direct defense of our borders. Eventually, we will have to reckon with sources of internal moral decay as well, and these should be recognized as a legitimate national security concern.

4) To what extent should we hold individual leaders accountable for the bloodshed and destruction rampant in the world today? Another salient lesson from the Book of Mormon is the extent to which leaders are responsible for widespread destruction and suffering that would not have occurred otherwise (Mosiah 29:21, 35–36). If certain leaders are, in fact, the source of threats to U.S. national security interests, under what circumstances, if any, would we be morally justified in holding them personally accountable?

5) When, where, and under what circumstances should the U.S. be prepared to commit military power and forces on behalf of our friends and allies abroad? Should combat troops be sent overseas only when vital U.S. national interests, defined in terms of realpolitik, are at stake? Or are there circumstances where military intervention is deemed a function of moral imperatives? For example, the U.S. sent troops to liberate Kuwait for reasons of traditional national interests. It sent troops to Somalia for humanitarian and nation-building reasons. Yet why are we hesitant to commit military forces to Bosnia–Herzegovina, except for peacekeeping reasons? Would our commitment be different if some compelling national interest were involved? Can we morally justify standing idly by, without even offering the means of self-defense, while genocide and other systematic atrocities are carried out on a massive scale? These matters warrant open, vigorous, and spirited debate.

Conclusion

During the Cold War era we were inclined to define our national security in narrow military and ideological terms. Now we must define our national security in broader terms—in terms of both physical security and moral integrity. We cannot consider ourselves “secure” unless we provide for our territorial security and preserve our moral ideals. If we jeopardize or lose our physical security, we cannot enjoy the liberty essential to the free exercise of our religion, faith, and agency. Moreover, if we allow our moral integrity to be jeopardized, we will no longer have recourse to the divine national protection promised in the Book of Mormon, and the loss of our physical security cannot be far behind, as repeatedly demonstrated in the scriptures. In this regard we should recognize that threats to our physical security come mainly from external sources while threats to our moral and spiritual security come mainly from internal sources. Once we
have defined our national security in terms of freedom and protection from threats to our physical and territorial safety as well as our spiritual and moral ideals, we can better discern legitimate threats and more effectively orient our defense policies, strategies, and resources.

Finally, this means that the emerging national security environment will demand a new balance between idealism, realism, and pragmatism, perhaps along the following lines. With regard to defining and establishing our nation’s goals, objectives, and interests, we should be idealists, with an enduring faith in the perfectibility of mankind. With regard to recognizing and discerning threats to our national survival, we should be realists, willing and able to make clear and objective assessments of the actual dangers to our national security. With regard to responding to those threats and allocating resources to defend our national interests against those threats, we should be pragmatists, recognizing the real limits of our national resources and our ability to extend aid to others. These proceedings should contribute significantly to determining the nature of this new relationship between realism and idealism in shaping a morally sustainable national security posture.

NOTES
1. Kerry M. Kartchner is representative of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, Geneva, Switzerland.
2. The views expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other U.S. government agency.

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